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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a general 
theory of economic flow, social exchange, and hegemonic 
relationships. The model is useful in four main 
areas: First, it exposes economic and social
relationships as they occur in power-free systems, 
which allows one to examine the degree of hegemony in 
the system under investigation; second, it provides a 
means of classification for economic systems; third, 
the theory provides the tools to develop a scheme of 
relative prices for a given economic situation; 
finally, it provides the means to identify historical 
discontinuities in economic systems. The model's 
usefulness in these areas of inquiry allows one to 
describe the dynamics of an economic system.
The theory combines aspects of the substantivist, 
formalist, and Marxist schools of thought. 
Demonstrations that this model applies across both time 
and space, and in both market and non-market economies 
are provided. Formal economic models of indifference 
analysis, consumer optimization, and theories of the 
firm provide for an examination of the rational 
behavior and motivations of merchants and individuals. 
Analyzing risk-return relationships and the effects of 
ceiling prices provides a more in depth look at the 
rational behavior of economic actors. Hegemonic and 
dynamic relationships are also considered after the 
construction of the ideal model.
The emergence of the Netherlands as the dominant 
capitalist state in the seventeenth century provides an 
interesting test case for the model. The review of the 
historical background of the Netherlands, within the 
constraints of the model, sheds new light on the 
economic and political factors that led to the rise and 
fall of the state. The model is also briefly tested 
against Mesopotamian price data from the Ur III period.
The model demonstrates that economic analysis can 
be employed cross-culturally and that it is an 
extremely powerful aid in the understanding of dynamic 
social and economic systems.
vi i
A General Theory of Economic Flow, 
Social Exchange, and 
Hegemonic Relationships
INTRODUCTION
In 1957 Karl Polanyi rocked the field of economic 
anthropology with his paper, "The Economy as Instituted 
Process." This paper was influential because it 
changed the view of many scholars and provided an 
opposing sphere of discourse in understanding economic 
activity in non-western, precapitalist contexts. The 
major premise of the substantivists was that, contrary 
to formalist economic theory, the economy in some 
societies is embedded in non-economic institutions 
(Godelier 1984:37). With the exception of Marxist 
anthropologists the field has remained split between 
the "formalists" and "substantivists" whose* methods of 
analysis and theoretical approaches to precapitalist 
economics differ.
In this thesis, I develop a new approach to 
economic anthropology that provides the means for 
comparative analysis between economies and explains the 
motivations driving individual economic choice. The 
goal of this paper is to achieve a truly cross-
2
3disciplinary approach to the field in which both 
economic and anthropological theory work together 
toward a single approach. The first chapter of the 
paper serves as a brief introduction to economic 
anthropology, and includes a discussion of the history, 
aims, and goals of the field. After a brief 
description of the field in general, it follows the 
development of economic theory from Thomas Hobbes 
(1651) to John Maynard Keynes (1936). This examination 
is followed by a discussion of the formalist movement 
in economic anthropology and the substantivist 
critique. Critical examination of each position rounds 
out the discussion. Other topics discussed include 
early thoughts on self-interest, Adam Smith's impacts 
on the field of political economy, utility theory, 
maximization, Karl Marx's impacts on the field, and the 
concept of rationality. Finally, the present state of 
the field, and recent trends, including the Marxist 
approach, are examined. The discussions in this 
section provide the groundwork for the main purpose of 
this paper, which is the development of a formal 
economic anthropological theory of exchange.
In the second chapter of the thesis, the major 
influences in the development of the Theory of Economic 
Flow, Social Exchange, and Hegemonic Relationships are
4discussed. The model has its roots in neoclassical 
microeconomic theory and thus a brief discussion of 
relevant theories and topics is provided. This chapter 
also examines the substantivist models developed by 
Karl Polanyi (1957) and Marshall Sahlins (1965), and 
their influences on the model. These authors's ideas 
run counter to the thoughts of the formal economists 
and provide a necessary critique of formalist 
thinking. By questioning the formalist claim of 
universal applicability of economic models, the 
substantivists force a formalist response. Marxist 
anthropology is another force which, in recent years, 
has come to the foreground of economic anthropology. 
Adding the dimension of history, which brought about 
changes in the forms of production, and raising issues 
of class conflict, distribution of income, and 
exploitation, these views are also incorporated into 
the model. Finally, another important influence in the 
development of the model is world systems theory 
(Wallerstein 1974; Lenin 1916; Wolf 1982). The idea of 
viewing economic actors as parts in a larger world 
system fits well with the model developed in this 
thesis. The idea of economic activity crossing 
political and cultural boundaries is critical to the 
theory developed here.
5In the third chapter, after defining some key 
terms, the model of Economic Flow, Social Exchange, and 
Hegemonic Relationships is developed. This theory 
explains the interdependence of social and economic 
relations, and provides the tools to identify and 
analyze the dynamics of economic systems. Hegemonic 
relationships between actors are also exposed by 
comparing predicted relationships to the actual 
situation. The theory combines aspects of 
substantivist, formalist, and Marxist schools of 
thought. Microeconomic models are employed and 
demonstrations show that this new approach applies 
across both time and space, and in both market and 
nonmarket economies.
In chapter IV, the model is tested against an 
historical example from the Netherlands. The emergence 
of the Netherlands as a dominant capitalist state in 
the seventeenth century provides an interesting test 
case for the model. By reviewing the historical 
background of the Netherlands, within the constraints 
of the model, new light is shed on the economic and 
political factors that led to the rise and fall of the 
state.
6Chapter V takes a brief look at another possible 
application of the model. An examination of the 
conclusions reached by Daniel Snell (1982) concerning 
silver balanced accounts during the Ur III period in 
Mesopotamia provides some interesting questions. The 
hypothesis that price stability varies with the 
geographic distance between trading parties is quickly 
tested under the model*s constraints. The paper 
concludes by posing some possible questions for further
4
research.
CHAPTER I
AN EXAMINATION OF THE FIELD AND ITS FOUNDERS
Economic anthropology, a major "sub-area" of 
anthropology, studies the social aspects of economics. 
The main goal of economic anthropology is to explain 
the economic activity of precapitalist, non-market 
economies. Market economies are studied, but to a 
lesser degree (LeClair and Schneider 1968; Polanyi 
1957). To achieve this goal, the field must explain 
the economic system's ties with the connected social 
and cultural systems of the society (Schneider 1974). 
This explanation of the ties to the connected systems 
distinguishes economic anthropology from the field of 
economics.
Today, most scholars would agree on the statement 
that economic activity cannot be disembedded from other 
activities, since it is a social process. Any move 
beyond this statement, however, leads to debate. Most 
of the credit for the statement belongs to founder of
7
8the £ield> Bronislav Malinowski, whose work preceded 
Polanyi's by several decades. His discussion of the 
Kula ring among Trobriand Islanders (1922) was the 
first attempt to examine economic activity as a social 
process. As has been noted, the problem with his work 
was that he used outdated and incorrect economic 
theory. Raymond Firth (1964:209) claims that 
Malinowski was essentially a descriptive economist who 
concentrated on demand side factors, failed to discuss 
how values were arrived at and their relation to price, 
and ignored the concept of scarcity. Malinowski did, 
however, start the anthropological inquiry into the 
social aspects of economics.
A significant problem in anthropological inquiry 
has been that anthropologists have not adequately 
examined or comprehended how modern economic theory 
developed. This hurdle, however, must be crossed in 
order to advance the field of economic anthropology.
In the field of economic anthropology one often 
encounters anthropologists who know some very 
elementary economics or economists who are vaguely 
familiar with anthropological theory. Frequently, this 
leads to the simple borrowing of data from the other 
discipline in order to apply it to one's own theories.
9A Brief History of Economic Anthropological Thought
In order to fully comprehend the goals of the 
field of economic anthropology, it is necessary to 
examine the history of its development. Economics as a 
behavioral science has only been organized since 1776, 
when Adam Smith presented the public with his Wealth of 
Nations. Very few scholars prior to Smith presented 
the same type of elaborate analysis of economic 
systems. This, according to E. K. Hunt (1979), was 
because prior to Smith's time scholars were writing in 
an era of socioeconomic transition. Since Smith's 
time, economics has undergone a great deal of change. 
Economists such as Jeremy Bentham (1780), William 
Stanley Jevons (1871), Karl Marx (1867), and John 
Maynard Keynes (1936), have changed the way we analyze 
and attack economic problems.
One of the major problems Adam Smith (1776) 
addressed was the relationship between self-interest 
and public welfare. This problem had been troubling 
scholars for many years and it continues as a topic of 
discussion to the present day. Prior to Smith, views 
ranged from Hobbes's (1651) claim, that man is in a 
"brutish" state and that self-interest must be 
controlled by society, to Derham's (1713) view that
self-interest is a gift from God and that it serves the 
needs of man. A brief view of some of the main themes 
developed prior to Smith is necessary to provide a 
complete picture of the problems facing the present day 
economic anthropologist.
One of the earliest views of self-interest came 
from Thomas Hobbes's (1651) Leviathan. In this work, 
Hobbes describes self-interest as the most powerful 
drive in man. In the drive to fulfill these interests, 
the individual will stop at nothing and will eventually 
destroy society. Hobbes's answer to this problem is to 
form a state with absolute control over the 
individual. In order to contain the destructive drive 
of self-interest individuals must submit to an 
artificial being or "Leviathan" which holds the powers 
of all individuals. Hobbes maintains that life without 
control is "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short" 
(1651:65).
There was widespread reaction to Hobbes's book; 
and according to Myers (1983), the methods used to 
criticize Hobbes fall into three categories. The first 
group of scholars (Shaftesbury 1711, Butler 1726, etc.) 
attacked Hobbes's claim using a psychological approach, 
proposing that self-interest is but one of many drives 
inherent in man and that a natural balance controls all
11
motives. The second group of scholars equated the 
drive of self-interest with the force of gravity.
Drawing on Newton's new discoveries, scholars such as 
Francis Hutcheson (1727) and Soame Jenyns (1757) use 
the laws of physics as an analogy to strengthen their 
arguments. The final group contended that self- 
interest leads to a natural division of labor within 
society. This division leads to greater productivity 
and a better life for all individuals. While Adam 
Smith had the most memorable view of self-interest and 
the division of labor, other scholars [William Derham 
(1713), James Harris (1744), and Joseph Priestly 
(1768)] had already discussed ideas regarding^ 
specialization and how it would lead to a more complex 
social system.
Scholars prior to Adam Smith can be seen as 
reacting to Hobbes's negative view of self-interest in 
a philosophical sense. They were attempting to explain 
man's actions as products of nature or part of some 
grand design. According to Myers (1983:5), Smith was 
the first to use a "genuinely economic solution to the 
classic problem of self-interest and the public 
welfare." Earlier reactions to Hobbes's claims acted 
to lessen the negative social and religious views of
self-interest and prepared the road for Smith's 
economic theory.
Prior to Smith's analysis, the more developed or 
"core" (Wallerstein 1974) countries in Europe were 
operating under mercantilist economic policies. The 
view was that demand was constant or that markets were 
in an equilibrium and did not have the opportunity for 
growth. In a situation such as this, lower prices 
could only lead to lower profits (Hintz 1985). As a 
result, mercantilists advocated policies that involved 
state imposed tariffs on imports (in order to keep 
prices high), and the creation of trade monopolies.
The primary goal of both the merchants and the state 
was the accumulation of gold and silver (Galbraith 
1987:39). Smith's analysis was a reaction to these 
mercantilist ideas. For Smith, the answer lay in the 
division of labor and free trade.
Adam Smith
While many economic theories were developed prior 
to Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, 
none of these had the same impact on economic thought. 
"He clearly saw that there were important 
interconnections between the major social classes, the
13
various sectors of production, the distributions of 
wealth and income, commerce, the circulation of money, 
the processes of price formation, and the process of 
economic growth” (Hunt 1979:34). Smith’s most 
important theory, for the purposes of this paper, was 
his labor theory of value which, although never fully 
developed, laid the foundation on which future scholars 
could build.
Smith based his theory on the belief that all 
production could be viewed as a series of human 
activities. His theory claims that in order for a 
commodity to have value, it must be the product of 
human labor. The theory continues by stating that the 
value of the commodity is determined by the amount of 
labor used to produce it. Smith believed his theory 
held true in precapitalist economies where there were 
no landlords or capitalists; however, in capitalist 
economies, Smith added profits and rents to labor to 
determine "natural" prices. Natural prices are the 
prices which are just sufficient to supply the 
capitalist, the landlord, and the laborer with the 
social average rates (historically determined) of 
profits, rent, and wages. Smith’s theory of price can 
be thought of as a summation of these three components 
(profits, rents, and wages) and has been described as a
cost of production theory (Dobb 1973). While Smith 
claimed that everyday market prices are determined by 
the forces of supply and demand he maintained that they 
will tend toward an equilibrium around the natural 
price. While this theory has many flaws, it provided a 
basis on which subsequent theorists could build more 
sophisticated theories of value.
While Smith's theory was widely accepted and 
improved upon, it did spark a reactionary movement. 
Economists after Smith either attacked his theory or 
defended it by adding new ideas or concepts. We shall 
first follow the reactionary movement through its 
course and then examine the defenders of Smith's 
theory. The criticisms of Smith's theory originated 
with David Ricardo (1817) and reached a peak with Karl 
Marx (1867).
Ricardo's Reaction to Smith
David Ricardo (1772-1823) was writing in times 
when wealthy landlords controlled most of the land and 
did not appear to be adding anything to the production 
process. Agriculture was seen as the most important 
industry in the economy, and it was here (the margin of 
agriculture) that profit rates were determined for all
15
other industries. His main interest was on the 
distribution of income among the different classes in 
society. He discussed how if the distribution of 
income changes then the size of the national product 
changes also, since measurements of value are relative 
to the level of an individuals income. In an attempt 
to solve the problem of value, he tried to find an 
measure which was invariant to distribution. 
Unfortunately, this invariant measure of value would 
not be discovered until more than a century after his 
death (Sraffa 1960).
Ricardo started the reaction against Smith by 
focusing on the distribution of income and class 
conflict. Ricardo viewed the margin of agriculture 
(where wages are the only cost) as the point where 
profits are determined. As the margin extends into 
less desirable land, the productivity of labor 
decreases, which leads to an increased investment in 
capital on the inframarginal land, thereby reducing 
profits. If labor costs drop for any reason, profits 
rise and capital accumulates. The higher profits 
reaped by the capitalist on the inframarginal land is 
seen by the landlord as cutting into his rent (Dobb 
1973). Thus, landlords wish to keep prices high and 
profits low through tariffs and other import duties.
16
By focusing on profits and rents Ricardo emphasized the 
class conflict between capitalists and landlords.
Karl Marx
Following the Ricardian school of thought and 
drawing on Hegelian dialectics, Karl Marx (1867) 
formulated the most controversial and best known 
critique of capitalism. Marx focused primarily on 
labor and class conflict. Marx also stressed that the 
economy is always changing and that the idea of 
studying systems in equilibrium was obsolete. While 
Marx admitted that the capitalist system created 
enormous amounts of wealth, he simultaneously 
criticized it for its unequal distribution of power and 
income, its susceptibility to depression, and the 
problem of monopolies (Galbraith 1987).
Marx saw that the government was serving the needs 
of business and that this power led to an unequal 
distribution of income. Borrowing from Ricardo, Marx 
claimed that wages reflect the added contribution of 
labor at the margin. Adding his own terms to the 
analysis he claimed that this "surplus value" produced 
by the laborers was extracted by the capitalist. In 
order to achieve higher rates of surplus value the
17
capitalist could either lengthen the work day (an 
increase in absolute surplus value) or increase the 
productivity of labor (an increase in relative surplus 
value) (Dobb 1973).
Distinguishing between constant capital (machines 
and other nonhuman means of production) and variable 
capital (labor power), Marx explained the cyclical 
nature of capitalist systems and the reasons behind the 
tendency for profits and wages to fall. When labor 
becomes relatively expensive (due to technological 
advances) capitalists begin to invest in more constant 
capital in order to increase productivity, this raises 
the constant capital to variable capital ratio and 
drives down the rate of profit. During this time 
laborers are forced out of work and this excess labor 
forces wage rates down. When wages are relatively 
cheap compared to capital the capitalist shifts back to 
labor intensive production. This cycle, inherent in 
capitalism, then repeats itself.
Marx created a movement which went beyond 
economics and reformed whole societies. His works 
gathered many followers in economics and anthropology 
and the Marxists are particularly strong in economic 
anthropology today. It is clear that one cannot ignore 
his works, and they serve to critique the present
18
thesis. The modern Marxist critique is covered in 
detail below.
In Defense of Adam Smith
A major breakthrough in economic thought, relative 
to the present thesis, came from Jeremy Bentham's 1780 
publication of An Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation. In this publication he claims 
that all human motivation can be reduced to one 
principle: The desire to minimize pain and maximize
pleasure. This is Bentham's "principle of utility."
While it is true that scholars before him (see 
especially, Hobbes 1651), and others after him (see 
especially Senior 1836), had discussed utility, it is 
also true that Bentham gave it its distinctive, 
classical formulation. Bentham conceived of humans as 
calculating maximizers of utility. Following Smith, he 
claimed the root of motivation is self-interest, which 
is man's "predominant" interest. Bentham also believed 
that humans were essentially lazy and ought to avoid 
any kind of work or exertion. Although considerably 
different, these principles were constructed on the 
classical foundation laid earlier by Adam Smith.
19
Bentham believed that the capitalist system was 
compatible with a just distribution of income.
However, near the end of his career, Bentham became an 
advocate of social, political, and economic reforms to 
create complete equality in the society. Subsequent 
disciples of Bentham (Thompson 1824, Mill 1848, and 
others) used utility theory to justify social reforms 
and even the abolition of free market capitalism. E.
K. Hunt (1979:137) shows that "whenever Bentham's 
utilitarianism is used (whether by Bentham, Mill, or 
Thompson) to justify reforms, restrictions, or 
abolition of free market capitalism, irreconcilable 
contradictions are involved.
Another important advance in utility theory came 
during the 1870s. It was during this decade that 
William Jevons (1871) and Carl Menger (1871) 
independently formulated the utility theory of value 
under which present day neoclassical economics 
operates. This advance was the formulation of the 
principle of diminishing marginal utility. This 
principle states that although total utility may 
continue to increase with an increasing quantity 
consumed, the final "degree of utility . . . ultimately
decreases as that quantity increases" (Jevons 
1970:11). The principle of marginalism allows the view
20
of humans as "rational, calculating, maximizers" to be 
put into mathematical terms (Hunt 1979:240). The 
development of marginalism also marked the transition 
from the field of political economy to economics (Breit 
and Ransom 1982:7). Menger (1871) formulated the 
theory of demand which states that the quantity 
demanded is inversely related to the price. Menger 
formulated this theory in the following way: If a
consumer’s marginal utility of saving money is higher 
than the marginal utility of consuming a good, the 
consumer will save; however as the price drops, the 
consumer finds that the marginal utility of consuming 
the good increases. This theory is graphically 
illustrated as a downward sloping demand curve.
The next major advance in neoclassical economics 
came in 1890, when Alfred Marshall published his 
Principles of Economics. Marshall made three important 
advances in utility theory relating to the firm.
First, he discussed how managers of firms attempt to 
reduce production costs by substituting one factor of 
production for another. Second, he outlined the law of 
diminishing marginal returns. When a firm increases 
the quantity employed of one factor of production 
relative to the quantity employed of another factor, 
the amount of increase at the margin, beyond a certain
21
point, begins to diminish (Hunt 1979:277). Finally, 
Marshall demonstrated how both the supply side (cost of 
production) and the demand side (consumer utility) 
interact to determine relative prices (Breit and Ransom 
1982:19). These advances provided a new theoretical 
approach to the problem of maximization and are still 
in use at the present time.
Until the 1930s three major ideological elements 
were at the heart of neoclassical economics. Hunt 
(1979) outlines these elements as follows:
(1) the marginal productivity theory of 
distribution, which pictured competitive^ 
capitalism as an ideal of distributive justice,
(2) the "invisible hand" argument, which pictured 
capitalism as an ideal of rationality and 
efficiency, and (3) the faith in the automatic, 
self-adjusting nature of the market, which 
demonstrated that the principal functions of 
government should be to enforce contracts and to 
defend the powers and privileges of private 
property (Ibid:374).
22
These macroeconomic (the branch of economics that deals 
with employment and prices) elements of neoclassical 
economics were used to defend laissez-faire 
capitalism. Belief in these elements led to non­
interventionist government policies until the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. During the Depression, when 
unemployment rose to 25 percent and production 
decreased nearly 50 percent (Hacker 1970), many 
economists began to believe that neoclassical economics 
was in need of an overhaul.
John Maynard Keynes
In 1936, John Maynard Keynes published The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, a book that 
dealt a lethal blow to the classical economic beliefs 
in Say's law (the idea that supply creates its own 
demand and that the system necessarily stays at full 
employment of resources (Say 1863)], production, and 
employment (Galbraith 1987) and provided the tools 
necessary for the economic overhaul. Keynes attempted 
to attack only the third element of neoclassical 
macroeconomics outlined above, the automatic, self- 
adjusting nature of the market and leave the other two 
elements intact. Unfortunately, some inconsistencies
23
in his analysis led to an indirect attack on all three 
elements. Keynes did, however, leave the microeconomic 
branch of economics (that branch that deals with 
individual firms and consumers) intact.
Keynes claimed that the assumption on which Say’s 
Law was constructed did not reflect the actual behavior 
of economic actors and that workers did not always 
spend all of their income (Chick 1983). Keynes 
identified three leakages from the circular flow 
(business-household-business) of money: savings, the
purchase of imports, and taxes. In his analysis of 
these leakages Keynes departed from the doctrines of 
neoclassical theory. He claimed that if injections 
(investment, exports, and government spending) did not 
exactly match the leakages a surplus in the aggregate 
supply would lead to a cut in production, which in turn 
would lead to a lower employment level that would only 
push the system further into depression. Keynes 
recognized that the system would eventually reach 
equilibrium but at a lower level of income and output. 
Keynes thus advocated governmental policies to overcome 
the "boom and bust" patterns of unrestricted 
capital ism.
24
Keynes's proposal for solving this dilemma was 
essentially twofold. First, manipulation of the money 
supply could be used to affect interest rates which 
would lead to a change in investment. He demonstrated 
that people have a demand for money or "liquidity 
preference" which was determined by (among other 
things) the speculative motive, that was directly 
related to the interest rate. If people expected the 
interest rate to increase in the future the demand for 
money would be high, but if the interest rate was 
expected to drop in the future people would buy bonds 
or other investments to lock in at the present rate, 
thus the demand for money would be low. By expanding 
or contracting the money supply (monetary policy) the 
central bank could affect the interest rate and the 
amount of savings and investment.
Keynes’s second proposal was to allow for the 
government to borrow the excess saving and spend the 
money on projects which would serve as injections into 
the economy and help create full employment (fiscal 
policy). Many economists of the time believed that the 
massive increases in governmental spending during World 
War II contributed to the end of the Depression. Since 
that time the United States has operated primarily 
under Keynesian economic policies that have kept
25
recessions short and growth periods long, although 
inflation and unemployment still persist.
Economists after Keynes, such as Paul Samuelson 
(1947), Joan Robinson (1970), and Milton Friedman 
(1962) have considerably affected the approach to 
modern economic policies. Generally, however, the 
economic policy of the modern capitalist world has been 
one of "leaning against the wind." Compensatory 
countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies are 
employed to keep the boom and bust patterns, common to 
unrestricted capitalism, in check. While Keynesian 
economists of the 1960s based their policy 
recommendations on a model which implied that economic 
processes led to steady growth, modern economists 
incorporate business cycles into their policy 
recommendations and attempt to keep a moderate amount 
of growth in the system while managing unemployment and 
inflation rates (Minsky 1975).
This brief introduction to economic theory is 
meant to serve as a base to the development of economic 
anthropological thought. While the field of economics 
has, in the past, demonstrated vast differences it has 
recently been united under what is called neoclassical 
economics. While it is true that other theories exist, 
the neoclassical approach is clearly the most widely
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accepted in economics. In contrast to economics, it 
will soon become evident that economic anthropological 
scholars are far from being united in their approach to 
the field. The major schools of thought, as I have 
indicated above, are the formalists, the 
substantivists, and the Marxists.
The Development o£ Formalist Thought
In the 1930s and 1940s, inquiries using "formal 
economic theory" began to appear from anthropologists 
such as Raymond Firth and Melville Herskovits. Firth 
(1939) and Herskovits (1940) applied formal economic 
theory to precapitalist economies. This new approach 
improved on the pseudo-economic approach previously 
used by Malinowski and others. LeClair and Schneider 
have defined this formal economic theory as:
a theory of rational choice built around a 
principle known as the "calculus of 
maximization." It assumes that people make 
choices among alternatives in a rational fashion, 
according to determinable principles; "rational" 
is defined by the theory (1968:6).
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The particular choice an individual makes is the one 
which, in the individual’s mind, will yield the maximum 
utility (gratification, satisfaction, or pleasure).
The theory is based on the notion that human behavior 
is oriented toward the maximization of some desired 
end. The individual may choose to increase his social 
status, political status, or any other area, rather 
than his economic status, depending on which he feels 
will provide him with the most overall satisfaction.
For example, if an individual chooses to receive a 
lesser amount of money for a good in order to appear 
generous (and possibly favorably influence the 
community’s opinion of the individual), it is still an 
economic decision since he is maximizing something 
(social status in this case). Utility in this sense 
serves as a common denominator to be used in comparing 
heterogeneous materials. In the modern world, money 
(expressed in units of price) often serves as the 
common comparative devise but, according to Kula 
(1976:176), in order to use prices in this capacity 
certain conditions must be met. First, generally 
uniform market prices formed through free competition 
must exist and second, all factors of production and 
goods must have a market price.
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Maximization is a fundamental concept in economics 
and is employed in both the theory of utility discussed 
above and the model developed here. Ferguson and Gould 
(1975) explain the assumptions economists make in the 
following statement.
Economists frequently assume that consumers 
attempt to maximize satisfaction and businessmen 
or entrepreneurs attempt to maximize profit. So 
defined, the goals of economic agents provide the 
economist with a frame of reference that permits 
systematic analysis of individual economic 
behavior (Ferguson and Gould 1975:2).
Robbins Burling (1962:181) adds that "people do not 
always try to maximize money, or basic biological 
satisfactions, or power, though all of these certainly 
do enter into our decisions, and, in a general way, the 
more we have, the happier we expect to be." Other 
fundamental, formal economic concepts such as "surplus" 
and "scarcity" are also applied to market and non­
market economies.
Formalists assume that every society must face the 
following fundamental economic challenge. How can 
limited resources be most efficiently used to satisfy
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unlimited wants? This is the economic problem of 
scarcity. They argue, if all resources are unlimited, 
no economic problem exists. Since all resources are 
scarce (with the possible exceptions of air, sunlight, 
and land in some cases), people must choose between 
scarce means and apply them to a multitude of ends.
Scarce resources can be increased, if at all only 
through effort or sacrifice. Formalists assume that 
people have always been required to choose between 
scarce resources.
In order to model people's behavior, economists 
assume that people act "rationally” and choose the 
means which maximizes their satisfaction. This is the 
concept of "economic man" which the critics invariably 
attack in their critiques of formalist theory. George 
Stigler explains the assumption as follows:
The concept of an "economic man" does not imply 
(as almost all of its critics state) that the 
individual seeks to maximize money or wealth, that 
the human soul is a complex cash register. It 
does not affect the formal theory ... in the least 
whether the individual maximizes wealth, religious 
piety, the annihilation of crooners or his 
waistline (Stigler 1946:63-64).
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In other words, formalists simply believe that economic 
theory covers more than just material goods, as the 
substantivists believe. This belief is one of two 
fundamental points on which the schools of thought 
d isagree.
The other point of disagreement between these 
schools of thought is the basic definition of 
’'economic." The substant ivists focus on the definition 
of economic as follows: The provisioning of material
goods as it serves to maintain the trading parties and 
thereby the society itself (this definition will be 
fully discussed later). Formalists claim that economic 
refers to "economizing" or, the allocation of scarce 
means to alternative ends.
The Subetantivlet Revolution
In contrast to the formalist approach, the 
substantivists focus on "relationships between people 
and on the different types of exchange mechanisms such 
as reciprocity, redistribution, and market systems" 
(Hodder 1982:199-200). This focus on people and how 
they relate places the material dimension of the 
transaction in a secondary position. The actorS in a 
precapitalist economy are not motivated by profit or
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material wants but rather respond to social motivations 
(Valensi 1981). These views were developed by Karl 
Polanyi in The Great Transformation (1944), "Our 
Obsolete Market Mentality" (1947), and Trade and Market 
in the Early Empires (Polanyi, Arensberg, and Pearson 
1957), as a result of which Polanyi gained many 
followers who have since expanded his theory (Dalton 
1961; Geertz 1963; Sahlins 1965; Kaplan 1968; Wheatley 
1975; Halperin 1977, 1988).
In order to fully comprehend the Substantivist 
Revolution, the concept of "formal" must be explained.
The concept of formal economic rationality originated
✓
with Max Weber (1947) who defined the concept,in 
reference to a culture’s ability to quantitatively 
account for its activities. Since any economy could be 
formally rational this concept could be applied cross 
culturally. In 1957, Polanyi defined formal economies 
in a new way that essentially equated formal economics 
with microeconomic theory and, as a result, made the 
formal definition applicable only to capitalist 
economies (Halperin 1985). Polanyi claimed that a new 
set of economic principles must be developed in order 
to analyze nonmarket economies. Finally, the concept 
of formal has recently been employed in discussions of 
model building. In this sense "formal" falls back on
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Weber's (1949) concept of the ideal type. The recent 
use of this definition of formal, according to Halperin 
(1985), can be traced to Plattner's (1975a) edited 
volume, Formal Methods in Economic Anthropology. In 
this book, Plattner, rather than treating decision­
making units as universals, treats them as ideals.
Substantivists claim that formal economic theory 
is only applicable to economies that operate on the 
market principle. Substantive economics refers to the 
fact that everyone in all situations needs sustenance, 
and in order to procure their needs individuals and 
groups employ resources, labor, and technology. In 
addition, humans almost always trade with other humans; 
thus, substantivists claim that this definition has 
universal applications (Dalton and Kocke 1983).
Substantivists also argue that the economic system 
functions to maintain the social system. They believe 
that prior to the development of the market, primitive 
society acted to minimize conflict. Any economy in 
which profit serves as a motivating force represents a 
break of .the economy from support of the social system.
According to Polanyi (1944), the economy is 
"embedded" in the social system. By this he means that 
the economy acts in conjunction with other forces to 
maintain the system as a whole and that the economy is
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an aspect of the social system rather than a segment of 
society (Gudeman 1986). Polanyi (1944) illustrates his 
theory by pointing to modern capitalism. He believes 
that market exchange and self-interest breeds conflict, 
a conflict that is dysfunctional to maintaining the 
system. For example, Polanyi argues that uncontrolled 
market exchange throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries ultimately led to a collapse of the 
system and subsequently to strict regulations and tight 
social controls (a movement toward re-embedding the 
economy into society).
In contrast, Polanyi believes that in 
precapitalist societies humans act on the economy in an 
essentially altruistic, nonaggressive, and 
noncompetitive mode. "Whatever self-interested 
elements seem to appear in the exchange, such as the 
use of and attempt to aggrandize money or other goods, 
is seen as a gloss on an essentially altruistic 
relationship" (Schneider 1974:3). Thus transactions, 
are thought to be weighted toward maintaining the 
social system rather than serving the individual’s self- 
interest .
A major focus of substantivist economics is the 
mechanics of distribution. Polanyi (1957) defines 
three types of distribution or "forms of integration",
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reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange, that occur 
in different sectors of the economy. In his 
definition, "reciprocity denotes movements between 
correlative points of symmetrical groupings; 
redistribution designates appropriational movements 
toward a center and out of it again; exchange refers 
here to vice-versa movements taking place as between 
'hands' under a market system” (Polanyi 1957:250). 
Reciprocity and redistribution are opposed to exchange 
since in a market system the purpose of the economy is 
profit (Valensi 1981). Even though Polanyi denies any 
evolutionary significance of these types, Marshall 
Sahlins (1965) expands on the concepts when he places 
the various types of exchange into an evolutionary 
scheme.
Sahlins places reciprocity in elementary societies 
and redistribution in chiefdoms and states. He 
discusses how friendship is related to the obligation 
to reciprocate in the exchange and constructs a 
continuum with generalized reciprocity at one end, 
balanced reciprocity at the center, and negative 
reciprocity at the other end (Sahlins 1965:152). Along 
this continuum, as friendship decreases, the social 
obligation to reciprocate increases. An altruistic 
relationship exists at generalized reciprocity and the
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obligation to reciprocate is nonexistent. At balanced 
reciprocity the friendship is balanced by self- 
interest. At the other end of the continuum the 
material dimension of the exchange dominates and the 
involved parties are viewed as enemies. Essentially 
Sahlins claims that prior to capitalism people were 
friendly but as society evolved friendship was replaced 
by hostile relations.
On the whole, the substantivist1s most important 
claim is that the economic system is embedded in social 
organization. They believe that the economic system 
separates from social organization with the 
institutionalization of the "self-regulating" market. 
George Dalton (1961) argues that substantivist 
economics has universal validity since it refers to the 
fact that individuals require sustenance which the 
social system must provide. Generally, the 
substantivists claim that individuals in a non-market 
economy are motivated by generosity and mutual 
cooperation, while individuals in a market economy are 
motivated by self-interest, which leads to conflict.
Many criticisms can be leveled against these 
substantivist views. A few of these criticisms are now 
examined.
Criticisms of Substantivist Economics
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While many criticisms can be leveled against 
substantivist economics, this paper focuses on three 
misunderstandings. First, reciprocity is compatible 
with the postulate of self-interest. Also, "the 
principle of generosity in a reciprocal economy can 
create conflict as well as contribute to solidarity, 
and can also be manipulated to secure an advantage over 
one's fellows” (Cook 1966:214). Second, Polanyi (1944) 
takes a romantic view of primitive economies and claims 
that the market economy "transformed” natural and human 
resources into commodities; Polanyi views this 
transformation as degrading to man. Finally, the 
distinction drawn between precapitalist and modern 
economies, based on the claim that precapitalist 
economies are embedded in social relations and modern 
economies are not, is incorrect.
Scott Cook (1966) addressed two of these factors 
in his critique of substantivist methods that marked 
the beginning of the famous formalist/substantivist 
debate of the late 1960s and early 1970s. He explains 
the first criticism as follows. "'Laying on obligations 
of reciprocity' (Sahlins 1962:1068) in a reciprocal 
economy is functionally equivalent to the selfish
seeking of gain or profit in a market economy” (Cook 
1966:214). In other words, exchange in a reciprocity 
based economy can operate on the principle of self- 
interest, and it can also cause animosity, due to the 
reciprocity obligations. Following this argument, self 
interest motivations, clearly present in precapitalist 
economies, are merely masked behind altruistic 
actions. As a result of this argument, formal economic 
theory cannot be dismissed on the basis that self- 
interest is not present in precapitalist economies.
Cook (1966) also examined the substantivist*s 
romantic view of nonmarket economies. Polanyi's 
romantic view can be seen in statements such as the 
following. "Only since the market was permitted to 
grind the human fabric into the featureless uniformity 
of selenic erosion has man's institutional creativeness 
been in abeyance" (Polanyi 1947:115). Polanyi's "Great 
Transformation" occurred when man lost his dignity to 
the market system. If one accepts the criticism 
discussed above, it is clear that people were 
subservient to their self-interest motivations prior to 
the institutionalization of the market system. The 
assumption that people were more creative and 
imaginative in nonmarket economic systems is simply an 
unfounded belief in a perfect precapitalist world.
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Essentially, this criticism attacks Polanyi's model on 
the basis that it is founded on the romantic 
assumptions of an ideal precapitalist world.
The third claim, that nonmarket economies are 
embedded in social relations while modern economies are 
not, is also subject to criticism. Basing their 
argument on this claim, substantivists contend that 
formal economic theory is only applicable to modern 
economies, where social relations play no role in 
economics. However, as Hodder (1982) points out, 
social relations do exist in modern economies.
Offering easier terms to good customers, price 
discrimination, and discounts to repeat customers are 
common examples of social relations in the modern 
economic world. Given these examples, in order for the 
substantivist's argument to be consistent, it either 
must reject formalist theory in all economies or accept 
it in all economies. I examine the modern formalist 
approach to economic anthropology in light of this 
issue.
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The Formalist Approach
The formalist approach to economic anthropology is 
based on the belief that formal economic theory is 
applicable to both non-market or "primitive” economies 
and market economies. All formal economic 
anthropological theories are based on the assumption 
that scarcity is a fact of life and that individuals 
make rational choices about how to use resources to 
their greatest advantage (Halperin 1985:346). Harold 
Schneider claims that three formalist approaches exist 
within this school of thought: social anthropology;
materialistic economic anthropology; and social 
exchange. The unifying element among these groups is 
"the partial or total acceptance of the cross-cultural 
applicability of formal theory" (Schneider 1974:9).
Bach of these approaches are now examined in detail.
Formalist social anthropological thought is fairly 
close to substantivist thought in its approach. Social 
anthropologists actually avoid formal thinking as much 
as possible and concentrate on attempting to show that 
economic relations not only involve a material exchange 
but also involve prestige and social position. This 
school places economic behavior subordinate to social 
behavior and, in fact, maintains that social behavior
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governs economic behavior. Social anthropologists 
(Nash 1961; Leach 1961; Firth 1964) also believe that 
economic behavior is immoral and disruptive of social 
behavior. The social anthropological school of thought 
falls into the formalist category because of its belief 
that some formal economic theory is cross-culturally 
applicable. The school also assumes that systems 
maintain themselves in equilibrium. While this school 
is similar to the substantivist school in many ways, it 
also displays some distinct characteristics which force 
it to be classified under the formalist heading.
The next group that falls under the formalist 
heading is the materialists. This group of scholars 
(Goodfellow 1939; Cook 1966, 1970; Schneider 1970) 
admits that formal economic theory may apply to the 
nonmaterial realm, but focuses on economic analysis and 
applies most of its theories to material goods. 
Materialists believe that while formal economic theory 
was developed to analyze modern Western economies, it 
may be applied elsewhere by fitting them to each 
specific situation.
i
Robbins Burling (1962) speaks out against the 
materialist view by claiming that the economic 
anthropologist must do more than apply formal economic 
models to precapitalist economies. He claims that as
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an anthropologist, one must get at the behavior of 
humans in particular situations, and not simply do what 
economists do in our society. "As long as we stumble 
along with the extraordinarily ethnocentric notion that 
somehow economics is primarily concerned with food 
production, or with material culture, or land tenure, 
or certain restricted types of labor, then we are 
missing any opportunity for fruitful communication with 
our economist colleagues" (Burling 1962:820).
The third group of formalists is the one that is 
attempting to develop a theory of social exchange.
While the materialists admit that economic models may 
apply to nonmaterial goods, they fail to apply their 
theories to this area. The social exchange theorists 
are attempting to, among other things, model the 
exchange which appears on the surface to be 
altruistic. This is an attempt to formally model what 
Polanyi calls "reciprocity." This group attempts to 
analyze social behavior as exchange.
Social exchange theorists (Belshaw 1965; Barth 
1966; Ekeh 1974) argue that interactions between 
persons may be formally modeled as an exchange of 
goods, material and non-material (Homans 1958). Peter 
Blau expresses his view of what social exchange 
consists of in this way:
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An apparent "altruism" pervades social life; 
people are anxious to benefit one another and to 
reciprocate for the benefits they receive. But 
beneath this seeming selflessness an underlying 
"egotism" can be discovered; the tendency to help 
others is frequently motivated by the expectation 
that doing so will bring social rewards (Blau 
1964:17) .
The model developed in this paper, as the title 
suggests, subscribes to this point of view. This point 
will become evident as the model is developed. A 
discussion of some of the criticisms of formalist 
theory is now in order.
Substantivist Views of Formal Economic Thedry
Substantivists attack formal economic theory in a 
number of ways. Three key criticisms are expressed 
best by Dalton (1961), Arensberg (1957), and Hodder 
(1982). These criticisms can be viewed as: The
inapplicability of formal models to precapitalist 
systems; the problem of analyzing the economic system 
independent of other related systems and; problems of
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practical application respectively. Each of these 
criticisms, as well as some others, are now discussed.
Economist, George Dalton (1961) claims that formal 
economic analysis was designed for, and is only 
applicable to, Western capitalist societies. He 
believes that economists have incorrectly concluded 
that models designed to analyze capitalist markets have 
universal applicability. Dalton argues that nonmarket 
economies have many aspects in common with modern 
capitalist economies but the conclusion that these 
aspects serve the same function is incorrect. Dalton 
discusses external trade, the division of labor, debt, 
the use of money, and other aspects as examples of 
areas in common between precapitalist and modern 
economies.
Another problem with formal economic models is 
that they assume that the economic system is 
independent of other social systems. Conrad Arensberg 
(1957) claims that economic problems arise out of man's 
institutions and their evolutions. If this claim is 
indeed true, then it would seem impossible to 
comprehend the economic system without reference to the 
other relevant systems (e.g. social system, political 
system). While isolating the economic system can serve 
to explain certain principles, a more accurate
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reflection of society can only be generated by 
examining the system as a whole. This is clearly one 
of the major drawbacks of formal economic theory.
Many formalist models, applied archaeologically, 
employ abstract mathematical formulas to the data in 
order to predict the amount of material likely to be 
found on the site. Substantivists have criticized the 
formalists, claiming "there is little attempt made to 
explore the social contexts and political strategies 
that lie behind the observed 'facts* - the artifact 
distributions, trade centers, and so on" (Hodder 
1982:202). Hodder's criticism is an attack on the 
narrow focus of most formal economic models.
Substantivists also criticize the formalists' use of 
the "economic man" model. The problem with this model 
is that peasants and farmers do not actually think in 
the terms the model assumes and using this model in the 
field is an extremely difficult task (Ortiz 1983).
David Kaplan (1968) claims that the formalists 
have a serious problem when they attempt to apply their 
theories to reality. If formal economic theory does 
not accurately model reality then a serious question 
arises about its usefulness. Finally, two major 
questions seem to be at the center of most debates 
between the two schools: 1. Did "markets" exist in
primitive economies?; and 2. If so, were they 
equivalent to the markets of modern economies? These 
questions get at the fundamental differences that exist 
between the schools. The formalists claim that some 
form of a market existed in precapitalist economies and 
that it is subject to formal economic analysis. The 
substantivists, on the other hand, claim that the 
production and distribution processes of material goods 
in nonmarket economies are different from market 
exchange processes and, as a result, are not subject to 
formal economic analysis.
Marxist Economic Anthropology
Marxist economic anthropology is another approach 
to the field which, in recent years, has gained a great 
deal of acceptance. While Polanyi (1944), Sahlins 
(1972), Wolf (1966), and others have employed many of 
Marx's ideas, none of them have completely followed in 
his footsteps. The Marxist tradition came to economic 
anthropology through Maurice Godelier's (1966) writings 
and slowly gained acceptance through the 1970s.
Marxist anthropology is "concerned with human economy 
as a whole and especially with its culmination in the 
present movement of world history, i.e., with the rise
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of industrial capitalism as the dominant force of our 
age” (Hart 1983:106). Marxism is a theory of 
production and transformation of societies and as a 
result it confronts the problems of kinship, religious, 
and economic systems (Godelier 1984). Marxist theory 
is organized as a criticism of both the social 
conditions of capitalist societies and the neoclassical 
theory employed to examine and improve those conditions 
(Wolff and Resnick 1987). Marxist anthropology has, as 
a result, been employed in all its varieties (Prattis 
1987) to analyze the historical processes of capitalist 
and precapitalist economies (Terray 1975; Clammer 1987; 
Godelier 1966, 1978; Frank 1969; Katz and Kemnitzer 
1979; Kahn 1980).
The theory is organized around the concept of 
class. Individuals' incomes are obtained because they 
participate in class processes that generate income 
(Resnick and Wolff 1987). In the capitalist mode of 
production there is a class division between the 
working class (proletariat) and the capitalist class 
(bourgeoisie). Most individuals must sell their labor 
power to an employer in exchange for wages. This labor 
power produces value equal to the amount needed to 
reproduce that labor power plus a surplus value that is 
appropriated by the capitalist. Thus, wages and
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profits are determined by the struggle between the 
workers and the capitalists (Giddens 1971). The 
capitalist is able to exploit surplus value (profit) 
because he or she maintains political power over the 
laborer (Plattner 1989c).
Overdetermination is another major concept on 
which Marxist theory is constructed. Overdetermination 
refutes the neoclassical premise that individual 
preferences, resource endowments, and technology 
determine supply and demand which, in turn, determines 
prices (Wolff and Resnick 1987). Marxist theory claims 
that every factor has both a cause and an effect and 
that complex linkages between these factors determine 
prices. Marxists stress that no one factor determines 
prices or income and that many nonclass processes 
interact with class processes to make those? 
determinations. Following this argument, Marxists 
claim that economic systems do not tend toward a state 
of equilibrium and must be analyzed in a constant state 
of chphge.
Marxist economic anthropologists focus on a number 
of topics. One of the more popular topics in recent 
years has been "underdevelopment" or "dependency" 
theory. Although a number of variations of this theory 
exist (Lenin 1916; Frank 1969; Mao 1971; and
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Wallerstein 1974), the main point is that the developed 
"core” areas of the capitalist world system exploit the 
dependent, underdeveloped, peripheral areas. This 
world system theory is discussed in detail later.
A Call for a New Economic Anthropology
Since 1957 the formalists and substantivists have 
remained split on the analysis of primitive or non- 
market economies. While the debate of the 1960s and 
197Qs has essentially passed, the field still maintains 
damaging divisions. Economic anthropology is clearly 
an "immature” field (Kuhn 1962) since a general 
concensus about the main issues, concepts, and 
conclusions does not yet exist. It appears that the 
time is right for a new school to emerge and combine 
the better aspects of both schools and the Marxist 
critique. in 1939, Raymond Firth had a vision of the 
requirements for the new school:
...what is required from primitive economics is 
the aria'lysis of material from uncivilized 
communities in such a way that it will be directly 
comparable with the material of modern economics, 
matching assumption with assumption and so
49
allowing generalizations to be ultimately framed 
which will subsume the phenomena of both civilized 
and uncivilized, price and nonprice communities 
into a body of principles about human behavior 
which will be truly universal (Firth 1939:29).
Unfortunately, no theory has lived up to the 
expectations Firth had for the field. As recent as 
1982, Timothy Earle stated the following:
No coherent body of theory exists to explain 
exchange and its linkage to broader sociocultural 
forms. However, a theoretical approach drawing 
from the formalist's notion of individual 
rationality and from the substantivist's notions 
of social context and systematic interaction seems 
both appropriate and feasible for an emerging 
field of prehistoric economics (Earle 1982:3).
The challenge for economic anthropology, according to 
Stuart Plattner (1989a:12) is to convert the formal 
economic models and concepts to "free them of hidden 
cultural bias." John Dowling (1980) describes the 
three axioms that link the modern thinking of the three 
schools of thought together: 1. The idea that people
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have infinite wants; 2. There are economy-specific 
assumptions and models; and 3. The form of the market 
depends on regional characteristics. Dowling claims 
that while the substantivists have ignored the first 
assumption, the formalists have held that all models 
and assumptions are universal, and the net effect of 
this has been that the schools have argued past each 
other. The model constructed below is one answer to 
the challenges posed by the above scholars and an 
attempt to unite the three schools of thought into one 
coherent paradigm.
Summary and Conclusions of Chapter I
This chapter focused on the development of 
economic theory, the development of an opposition 
between the formalist and substantivist schools of 
economic thought, and the Marxist critique of economic 
theory. The field of economic anthropology became 
divided in its quest to construct models of 
precapitalist economic systems and their relations to 
the accompanying social systems. It is evident that a 
number of problems associated with a cross-disciplinary 
study caused this division. One of the major problems
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has been determining the relevant economic theories and 
comprehending their complex developments over time.
Above I attempted to demonstrate that economic 
anthropology has remained split since 1957. The 
formalists, the substantivists, and the Marxists have 
all established a firm foothold in the field. In 
addition, It has been shown that these three schools 
have advantages and disadvantages in their approaches.
On the whole, however, it appears that the formalist 
school has the most to offer to the field. It is clear 
that a total rejection of formal economic theory is 
justifiable only in ideological terms. While the anti­
market mentality certainly has its place in certain 
types of societies, it is no longer a useful "generic" 
approach in the field of economic anthropology.
According to Hodges, one reason for the recent waning 
of substantivist thought could be that "the science of 
economics, with all its arithmetic calculations induces 
the arbiter to think twice about the woolier notions 
encapsulated in the substantivist treatises" (Hodges 
1988:13-14). Hodges continues that many of the 
remaining substantivists have been pursuaded to join 
with the Marxists (a school with which they share a 
great deal of thought). Marxist anthropology provides 
a number of important ideas and serves as a powerful
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critique of theories. The field clearly needs a fresh 
paradigm which combines the better aspects of all three 
schools of thought.
In the next chapter, some of the major influences 
in the development of the General Theory of Economic 
Flow, Social Exchange, and Hegemonic Relationships are 
examined. While the theory is firmly rooted in 
neoclassical microeconomics, it has been considerably 
influenced by some of the major substantivist and 
Marxist arguments. These influences are discussed 
below in chapter II.
CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GENERAL THEORY
The General Theory of Economic Flow, Social 
Exchange, and Hegemonic Relationships, although based 
primarily on formalist principles, was influenced 
significantly by the works of Karl Polanyi (1957), 
Marshall Sahlins (1965), and Immanuel Wallerstein 
(1974). In essence, these models are expanded and 
converted into a social exchange model firmly grounded 
in formal, neoclassical, microeconomic theory. The 
following discussion provides background information on 
these models and other concepts from which it 
originated.
Polanyi and Sahlins
The key point of Karl Polanyi*s ”The Economy as 
Instituted Process" is the "forms of integration" 
concept. Polanyi claims, reciprocity, redistribution,
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and exchange, are the three types of interdependence 
that occur between the parts of an economy. These 
forms of integration serve as the point of departure 
for both Sahlins's article and the present thesis.
While Sahlins places the forms into an evolutionary 
scheme, this paper incorporates them into less 
inclusive, more precise categories.
Polanyi claims that reciprocity occurs in the most 
simple societies and is motivated by obligations to 
kin. Polanyi adds that the kinship system must exist 
prior to the reciprocity and "a kinship system never 
arises as the result of mere reciprocating behavior on 
the personal level” (1957:251). This idea serves as 
the inspirational force behind the delayed and equal 
flow models constructed in this paper. The main 
difference between Polanyi's position and the present 
thesis is the motivating force driving the exchange.
In Polanyi's scenario the individual is seen as acting 
in an altruistic manner and in the present thesis the 
individual is viewed as acting out of self-interest.
The next substantive type of economy that Polanyi 
discusses is the redistribution economy. In the 
present thesis, this type of exchange falls into the 
same analytical categories as an economy operating 
under reciprocity. While Polanyi focuses on
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distribution to establish his types of economies, the 
present paper focuses on the social relations involved 
in the exchange and the degree to which pure profit 
acts as a motivating force. Redistribution, as an 
analytical type, has no direct parallel in this paper.
Polanyi's final type of economy is one where 
exchange facilitates the movement of goods. Polanyi 
lumps all forms of trade into this one universal type 
of economy. He, for example, fails to separate 
monopolistic exchange from competitive exchange. Even 
with this flaw in his argument, Polanyi creates a very 
powerful model which, when combined with some of the 
ideas of Marshall Sahlins (1965), serves as the point 
of departure for the present thesis. In this paper, 
the universal, formal type of economy is broken down 
into two, more specific analytical categories: general 
flow and exploitative flow.
Sahlins* (1965) paper, "On the Sociology of 
Primitive Exchange", expands on Polanyi's forms of 
integration by placing them in an evolutionary scheme. 
Sahlins places reciprocity in elementary societies, 
redistribution in chiefdoms, and exchange in states. 
However, more importantly, Sahlins constructs a formal 
typology of reciprocities. He superimposes the 
reciprocities onto a continuum ranging from generalized
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reciprocity to negative reciprocity. The relationship, 
between friendship and the obligation to return gifts, 
along this continuum can be expressed such that as 
friendship decreases the obligation to reciprocate 
increases. "The distance between the poles of 
reciprocity is, among other things, social distance..." 
(Sahlins 1965:191).
In discussing the different forms of reciprocities 
developed by Sahlins, one must remember that the 
economic exchange is strictly material. At the 
generalized reciprocity end, material flow is 
unidirectional; nothing material is given in return.
The social "spirit of exchange" at this point is 
"disinterested concern for the other party" (Sahlins 
1965:193). Balanced reciprocity assumes that the 
material flow is equal and the social spirit is mutual 
concern between the parties. At the other end of the 
spectrum is* negative reciprocity. This is the 
"unsociable extreme", where the attempt is to get 
something (material) for nothing. At this end the 
material flow can again be one-way. Sahlins claims 
that the type of reciprocity carried out depends on 
social relations or kinship ties.
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Harold Schneider (1974:154) provides a good 
interpretation of Sahlins's evolutionary scheme. He 
claims that in a generalized exchange there is a norm 
that dictates that wealth must be shared without 
rationalistic, maximizing calculations by the 
exchanging individuals. In the balanced situation, the 
norms, which in the generalized situation ensure an 
even distribution of wealth, now ensure "peaceful and 
honorable" economic behavior. In negative reciprocity, 
these norms all but disappear.
There are several problems in Polanyi and Sahlins' 
analyses; however, the first major problem with the 
model is the fact that only material goods are 
considered in the exchange. One can clearly observe 
the problem with the model when a service is included 
as part of the exchange between two parties. If we 
employ Sahlins' model to comprehend a situation in 
which one person trades a good in return for a service, 
we quickly witness the limitations of the model. Even 
if the exchange is "economically" balanced, Sahlins 
would place the exchange in either the "generalized" or 
"negative" reciprocity category since the "material" 
exchange was unequal. This problem stems from the 
substantivist's definition of "economics" discussed in 
section I. Even if it is assumed that Sahlins includes
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services in his model/ it is clear that he overlooks 
social exchange. Sahlins* model cannot explain an 
exchange of friendship.
A second problem is that it is limited spatially 
and temporally. The model only applies to 
precapitalist/ non-market economies. While it is 
recognized that Sahlins was not attempting to develop a 
model with space and time dimensions; it is also 
recognized that a good theory explains many 
situations. James Lett describes a good theory in the 
following way:
Good theory explains not just the special case 
(like catastrophism in geology), but all related 
cases. The function of theory is to decide 
whether any two cases are related. Ideally, good 
theory relates cases that previously were thought 
unrelated (Lett 1987:29).
An argument can be made that Sahlins* model covers the 
related cases in primitive economies and leaves modern 
economies to economists. However, the argument can 
also be made that the model deals strictly with the 
special case of nonmarket economies. Clearly, the 
theory provides many valuable insights into
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precapitalist economies, but it still leaves many 
unanswered questions about the dynamics of those 
economies.
Third, one can fault Sahlins on his choice of the 
word "reciprocity.” Reciprocity, by definition implies 
a "back and forth" movement. How can one use the term 
reciprocity when describing a one-way movement of 
material? Clearly, Sahlins* only correct usage of the 
term is "balanced reciprocity." While one could claim 
that this is a minor semantic point that need not be 
criticized, one could also claim that this adds to the 
confusion that Sahlins generates in his model.
Finally, critically reviewing Sahlins1 (J.960) 
early work, Clammer (1978) claims that Sahlins uses the 
argument that nonmarket economic behavior is completely 
different from capitalist economic behavior since it is 
mainly an aspect of kinship behavior. One of Clammer's 
main criticisms of this argument is that if classical 
economics is not applicable outside of capitalist areas 
then relations of production similar to those in the 
capitalist mode of production must not exist. Clammer 
(1978:6) claims that it is "but a small step from this 
position to the claims that, firstly, class relations 
are a characteristic only of capitalism - where 
capitalism does not exist neither do class relations
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(even of a different kind), largely because of the 
subsidiary claim that in primitive societies 
differential access to wealth is not related to 
questions of rank, status and power; and, secondly, 
that relations of exploitation do not occur within the 
productive situations discovered in such societies.”
Influential Microeconomic Theory
While many economic theories had a great deal of 
influence on the development of the general theory, the 
most influential microeconomic theory to the model is 
the principle of utility. Bentham (1780) claimed that 
all human motivation arose from self-interest and the 
desire to minimize pain and maximize pleasure. This 
concept was improved by William Jevons (1871) and Carl 
Menger (1871) when they added the principle of 
diminishing marginal utility. This principle states 
that although total utility may continue to increase 
with increasing consumption, the final degree of 
utility ultimately diminishes as the quantity increases 
(Jevons 1871).
This theory laid the foundation for the modern 
neoclassical determination of value. The problem prior 
to Jevonsfs proposal was how to quantify use value of
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commodities since they could have different use values 
to different people (Dobb 1973). Employing the idea of 
utility, models can be constructed to demonstrate the 
factors that lead to exchange. These models are 
discussed in detail in the next section. Other 
economic principles such as risk-return relationships, 
the effects of ceiling prices, and the model of perfect 
competition have also influenced the development of the 
model. Without such theories it would be much more 
difficult to model economic and social exchange.
Clearly, without Adam Smith's foundation and 
Keynes’s overhaul, the neoclassical economic theories 
in use today would be considerably different. However, 
modern economic activity such as compensatory, 
countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies do not 
apply to precapitalist economic systems. One of the 
most important propositions of substantivist economic 
anthropology is that universal economic principles are 
difficult if not impossible to construct. I propose 
that the most basic motivations driving exchange can be 
universally modeled, but that more complex economic 
models must be carefully applied to their intended 
areas of inquiry.
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World Systems Theory
In addition to economic and economic 
anthropological theory, this model also employs 
concepts developed in the world systems paradigm. 
Following Wallerstein (1974), Wolf (1982), Rostow 
(1960), Lenin (1916) and others, this model employs the 
idea of core states exploiting peripheral areas for 
their own gain. The unequal distribution of power 
among states (and individuals) allows exploitative 
economic exchange networks to exist and even flourish. 
Scholars who describe economies using world systems or 
underdevelopment theory argue that the underdevelopment 
in the peripheral states is a consequence of 
development in the core states and not the result of 
internal problems (Emmanuel 1972; Kahn 1978). By 
analyzing commodity flows, the migration of labor, and 
the exertion of imperial power within the larger world 
system, one can clearly see the influence of capitalist 
core states on peripheral, less developed economies 
and, as Donham (1990) points out, these factors have 
connected the core and periphery far longer than 
anthropology has admitted to in the recent past.
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International trade has long been recognized as an 
important factor in capitalist growth. Adam Smith 
(1776) and David Ricardo (1817) recognized that 
international trade could lead to the accumulation of 
capital and Marx (1867) assumed that expansion of 
capitalism into international markets would lead to 
industrialization in those areas. A formal theory of 
imperialism, however, was not developed until early in 
the twentieth century (Larrain 1989). The theory of 
imperialism developed by Hobson (1902), Bukharin (1915, 
1924), Luxemburg (1913, 1915), Hilferding (1910), and 
Lenin (1916), has had substantial influence on the 
field of economic anthropology and is incorporated into 
the present thesis.
Power within the modern capitalist world economy 
has been (and still is) unequally distributed.
Following Wallerstein (1974) and Braudel (1977) every 
world economy is divided into three zones. The core or 
the area where economic power is centered, the semi­
periphery or intermediate zones around the core state, 
and the periphery or subordinate area. The standard of 
living drops as one moves away from the core and within 
the peripheral zones ’’life often resembles purgatory or 
even hell" (Braudel 1977:82). When one core state 
becomes overwhelmingly dominant it is defined as a
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"hegemonic" state. Wallerstein (1980:38) defines the 
hegemonic situation as one "wherein the products of a 
given core state are produced so efficiently that they 
are by and large competitive even in other core states, 
and therefore the given core state will be the primary 
beneficiary of a maximally free world market." The 
ability to trace the dynamics of hegemony across the 
world system adds an important dimension to the model 
developed here.
With formal neoclassical economic theory as a base 
and Polanyi and Sahlins' substantive economic models as 
a point of departure, the model is clearly constructed 
on solid ground. The social exchange theory developed 
in the present thesis pushes economic anthropology to 
the next step of development. Modeling the motivations 
driving exchanges of individual economic actors and the 
dynamics of hegemony within the world systems paradigm 
provides valuable insights into economic development 
and change. The theoretical background discussed above 
should provide the reader with the tools necessary to 
comprehend the model constructed in chapter III.
CHAPTER III
A GENERAL THEORY OF ECONOMIC FLOW, SOCIAL EXCHANGE, AND
HEGEMONIC RELATIONSHIPS
The theory constructed below provides the field of
economic anthropology with a valuable new tool that can
be employed to analyze both past and present economic 
systems. The general theory is useful in four main
areas of inquiry. First, by exposing economic and
social relationships as they occur in a powerless 
system, the theory allows one to examine the degree of 
hegemony in the system under investigation.' Second, 
the theory provides a means of classification for 
economic systems that can be employed to determine 
which particular formal economic models apply to each 
situation. Third, the theory provides the tools to 
develop a scheme of relative prices for a given 
economic situation. These three uses allow one to 
describe the dynamics of the economic system under
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analysis. Finally, the model provides the means to 
identify historical discontinuities in economic 
systems. Before I can construct the model, however, I 
must provide the definitions of key terms and explain 
and describe the essence of the problems the model is 
intended to solve.
What's in a Naras?
Prior to constructing the model, one must first 
understand the reasoning behind the choice of the word 
"General" in the title. The reasoning becomes more 
evident as the theory develops, but essentially the 
term is used because the theory ignores many detailed 
variations. As a result, the very basic theory is 
applicable across both time and space, and works on an 
individual, societal, and world economy scale. It 
covers both* precapitalist, nonmarket economies and the 
highly complex industrial economies of the modern 
world. It is recognized, however, that models used to 
examine particular exchange scenarios may not be 
universally applicable. The more basic model developed 
here is an attempt to gain insights into the 
motivations driving exchange. Most economic 
principles, as discussed in section I, were developed
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in response to a particular historical problem and, as 
a result, usually serve to shed light on that problem.
For example, while Adam Smith advocated free trade in 
eighteenth century England, he most certainly would not 
have advocated it in the seventeenth century since 
England's infant industry needed protection from 
outside forces [protectionist policies are presently 
being discussed in the United States to protect 
industry from cheap foreign imports (Stein 1984)1.
The terms "economic flow" and "social exchange" 
are integral to the model. While many people associate 
economics only with the material world, this paper does 
not. Economic flow is defined as the exchange of 
material and nonmaterial goods. A nonmaterial good can 
be viewed simply as a service, such as paying a gas 
station attendant to pump your gas, or more complexly 
as friendship, power, love, or any other nonmaterial
good. In situations where no material goods flow in
>
either direction between the parties, the term "social 
exchange" is employed. It is important to remember, 
however, that economic flow does not necessarily imply 
a two-way flow of material goods.
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Profit and Interest
A capitalist is the owner of the means of 
production (capital) and this individual's remuneration 
(interest) is determined by the contribution the 
capital makes to the production process. Capital is 
defined simply as financial resources (including 
material goods used in a production process) (Braudel 
1977). The entrepreneur, as defined by Schumpeter 
(1911), is the individual who introduces a new process 
or a new type of productive organization and with the 
aid of bank credit upsets the established equilibrium 
of the system. The term "profit" is key to the model. 
Profit is defined as the entrepreneur's or capitalist's 
remuneration for taking an economic risk.
For the purposes of this paper, profit and 
interest will be considered as interchangeable terms 
(the two frequently blend in the real world). [Pierro 
Sraffa (1960) provided a powerful critique of the 
neoclassical model when he demonstrated that capital is 
inextricably linked to the interest rate and that 
profits are the result of negotiations between 
capitalists and laborers and power is a major force in 
these negotiations. Profit is simply surplus minus 
wages and thus risk is not a factor in normal profit].
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Remuneration can come in any form; the entrepreneur may 
receive social benefits, monetary payments, political 
power or any other form of payment. This definition of
profit is what economists refer to as "normal" profit.
Any profit over and above the "normal” return for a 
given risk is called "pure" profit (Maurice and 
Phillips, 1986:341).
Normal profit can be viewed as a cost that the 
consumer pays to the entrepreneur. Other costs that
the consumer faces when purchasing a good or service
include: the wages for the labor involved in the
production of the good; the cost of the resources used 
to produce the good; and the rent on the land? where the 
good is produced. All of these costs are figured into 
the "price" of the good. Many other factors such as 
supply and demand, market structure, and price 
discrimination also affect the final cost of a 
product. The simple fact that a profit is involved in 
an exchange does not necessarily create an unequal 
exchange.
Pure profit is an important concept in the model, 
since it can be seen as creating a dividing line on the 
continuum between primary and secondary social 
relationships. The model demonstrates that on the side 
of the line where social relations exist prior to the
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exchange (primary social relationship), pure profit is 
not the motivating force. On the other side of the 
dividing line the profit motive is the incentive 
driving the exchange (secondary social relationship).
In fact, in secondary social relationships, the 
individuals are attempting to maximize profits and 
achieve a pure profit in the exchange (it is 
demonstrated later that certain market conditions 
prevent pure profits from being earned in the long- 
run). The two types of relationships between 
exchanging parties have been defined by Granovetter 
(1985) as "atomized" and "embedded." Atomized 
transactions are short term, impersonal, and not 
organized in any social structure (secondary social 
relationships) while embedded transactions involve 
personalized relationships that endure beyond the 
exchange (primary social relationships).
It is recognized that "profit" is not always the 
goal of rational economic actors. Power, prestige, 
salary, and a host of other motivations can serve as 
the motivating force for exchanges. Plattner (1985:xi) 
claims the current view of individual economic decision 
making "sees individual economic behavior as the 
outcome of a multicausal, goal-driven decision 
procedure, where the actor is operating in relative
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ignorance and uncertainty, with complex goals and 
constraints." Although the actor may not always 
recognize the full terms and conditions of the 
exchange, it is assumed that the actor behaves 
rationally and maximizes something of interest. For 
convenience, the term "profit" and "pure profits" will 
be used to represent the goals of economic actors.
The final term that must be defined is hegemony. 
Hegemony is used in this paper to describe the ability 
of one actor, participating in a series of exchanges 
with another actor, to maintain an economic advantage 
over the other actor, without recourse to force, by 
exchanging on a more exploitative, less social level.
This definition is similar to Wallerstein’s (1980:38), 
but includes a social relationship aspect. A more 
descriptive definition of hegemony is provided after 
the dynamics of the model (constructed first in power- 
free, static form) are discussed.
Areas of Inquiry
In a situation where power plays no role, each 
type of economic flow has a specific type of social 
relationship that accompanies it. This critical 
relationship between the economic and social relations
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is the first area of inquiry that the model addresses.
In a given situation, assuming neither actor maintains 
hegemony, once one relationship (economic or social) is 
determined and classified, the theory predicts the 
specific corresponding relationship. When a given 
economic relationship fails to correspond with the 
predicted social relationship, this is an indication of 
hegemony. Different degrees of hegemony can be 
measured by determining the amount of discrepancy 
between the predicted and actual relationship. The 
usefulness of this area of inquiry is displayed in 
chapter IV.
It is recognized that individuals and groups may 
be involved in a number of exchange activities at any 
one time, and as a result, the participants may be in a 
number of categories. In this situation, parties 
involved in a number of exchange relations must be 
analyzed in one category at a time. As a result of 
multiple classifications, it often becomes difficult to 
determine the dominant category for the system as a 
whole. This leads to the second area of inquiry, that 
the theory addresses.
The theory provides for a classification of 
exchange systems that can be employed to determine 
which particular formal economic models apply to each
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situation. In addition to determining which models 
apply to the situation, this classification also allows 
for price studies to be conducted. Price studies can 
demonstrate to the researcher, who is confronted with a 
list of prices, whether a particular price is 
comparatively high or low. This type of study can be 
important in establishing the context and meaning of 
the economic transaction. Once a system has been 
placed into a specific category, this allows the move 
to a more sophisticated level of analysis. At the 
higher level of analysis, the classification allows one 
to postulate the dynamics of the system by identifying 
its fundamental characteristics.
Describing the dynamics of a given exchange system 
is the highest level of analysis and ultimate goal of 
the model. Applying microeconomic models to each 
’’ideal" (Durkheim 1915; Weber 1949 ) category allows one 
to view the dynamics of the system. Each of these 
categories or types of economic flow and social 
exchange are discussed below in detail.
The identification of discontinuities in economic 
systems is the fourth area of inquiry. When describing 
the dynamics of an economic system as a whole, certain 
parameters necessarily apply to each ideal type. If 
the parameters exceed the bounds of that type, the
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particular models designed to explain the system break 
down. It is at this point where an historical 
discontinuity is identified.
If one was simply to analyze a material exchange 
in a market economy, microeconomic analysis of 
individuals and firms could be readily applied to the 
situation. The substantivists, however, claim that in 
precapitalist economies situations exist in which goods 
seemingly flow in one direction (gift giving). It is 
in these situations (and the others discussed above) 
that they claim microeconomic analysis breaks down.
The model constructed below disputes this substantivist 
claim. Exchange modeled in this analysis may, involve 
both material and non-material goods. The flow may 
consist of economic goods or services, social exchange, 
or a combination of both. In order to model a 
seemingly unidirectional material flow, one views the 
giver of gifts as equivalent to the firm and the 
receiver as a consumer. In a situation such as this, 
one would analyze the giver using microeconomic 
theories that apply to firms (see Shepard 1985;
Ehrenberg and Smith 1982) and the receiver using 
indifference analysis. These theoretical approaches 
are addressed below.
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In the model, we begin by assuming first, that 
exchange occurs in a power-free system. Secondly, each 
type of flow discussed below models the first economic 
exchange between the actors. According to Levi-Strauss 
(1969) exchange behavior is dynamic and creative in 
that humans assign meaning to what they give and 
receive and alter their interactions with others on the 
basis of their interpretations. It is acknowledged 
that social relationships develop as a result of 
economic exchanges and that social relationships change 
over time. The role of hegemonic and dynamic social 
relationships, however, are discussed after the 
theoretical model has been constructed.
The Model
The model, graphically illustrated in Figure 1, is 
constructed in the following way. First, an economic 
flow continuum is constructed. On this continuum six 
"forms of integration" exist: 1. Delayed flow; 2. Equal 
flow; 3. General flow; 4. Exploitative flow; 5. 
Unidirectional flow; and 6. Non-flow. These types of 
flow are divided into these categories according to the 
following criteria: 1. The degree to which the 
transaction is or is not economically equivalent; 2.
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Whether or not social relations exist prior to the 
economic transaction; and 3. Whether or not pure 
profit is the motive driving the transaction. Delayed 
and equal flow are referred to as secondary economic 
relationships; general, exploitative, and 
unidirectional flow are referred to as primary economic 
relationships; and non-flow is a situation in which an 
economic relationship is nonexistent. The purpose of 
distinguishing between these relationships is addressed 
later.
The question of which type of transaction is the 
most "rational” depends on the particular case under 
investigation. When risk is involved, economists 
assume that humans act rationally and maximize their 
"expected" utility (Heath 1976). Stuart Plattner 
discusses how, in peasant economies, transactions 
cannot always be neatly differentiated as impersonal, 
short term exchanges and long term trading
partnerships. "The goal of each actor is his or her
*
economic self-interest, yet the maintenance of the 
relationship is valued over an immediate short-run 
profit" (Plattner 1989b:212).
The other half of the model deals with social 
relations. The economic flow continuum is superimposed 
onto a specific set of social relations. For the
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purpose of creating a general model, attention must be 
given to the fact that "distance" is a relative term 
and cannot be used as a qualifier in every instance.
In the modern world, geographic distance between 
exchange partners is rapidly becoming irrelevant, 
modern technology allows for global communications and 
reduces shipping time to a minimum. On the other hand, 
according to Sahlins (1965), in precapitalist societies 
trade distances are short and exchange partners are 
usually within the kin group. Sahlins constructs his 
model of nonmarket exchange using kinship residential 
sectors. He discusses five sectors: The household;
the local lineage; the village; the tribe; and the 
intertribal sector. Sahlins (1965:198) points out that 
"relations within each sphere are more solidary than 
relations of the next, more inclusive sector." As one 
moves away from the household relationships become less 
trusting.
Ian Hodder (1978) examines artifact distribution 
and the effect of distance on human interaction by 
employing fall-off curves. His analysis suggests that, 
in addition to the friction effect of distance, a 
number of factors contribute to the distribution of 
artifacts. Included among the other contributing 
factors are physical geography, the social and economic
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value of the artifact, freedom of exchange, and 
accessibility to other exchange networks. Hodder 
claims that "with distance away from a source or centre 
there is less likelihood of interaction with that 
centre" (1978:157). Figure 1 is a graphic illustration 
of the model of Economic Flow and Social Exchange in a 
power-free situation. Figure 1 shows that, as one 
moves out from the center point, kin-residential 
distance increase as well as the desire to reap profits 
from the situation. The illustration displays the 
predicted social relations for each economic relation 
under the assumption of no hegemony.
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FIGURE 1. A diagram of economic flow and 
social exchange in a power free situation.
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Delayed Flow
Delayed flow is the most "social” type of flow on 
the continuum. In order for this type of flow to take 
place, permanent social relations must exist prior to 
the economic transaction. These types of relations 
exist in the family group and possibly within a group 
as large as a village. Sahlins (1968) claims that 
since a profile of exchange is "purely hypothetical", 
it is necessary to adjust the standard model to fit 
variations found in real societies. In times of 
shortages the normal tight sphere of delayed exchange 
may be extended to include a larger group. The 
permanent social relationship between the parties 
allows for a time lag or "delay" to exist between the 
initial economic flow and the return flow.'
As stated previously, one can analyze the 
apparently altruistic giving of a gift by viewing the 
giver as a firm and the receiver as a consumer of the 
product. First, we analyze the gift giver in the 
relationship. It is assumed that the giver (firm) 
operates to receive a return on his or her investment. 
Giving a gift away involves some amount of risk; which 
simply means that there is a probability that things 
will turn out badly. The receiving party must
81
compensate the giving party by paying a risk premium, 
as illustrated in Figure 2.
Risk
PremiumRisk
Premiumo
Delayed 
flow (Riskless) 
Rate of 
Return
RGRE
Degree of Risk
FIGURE 2. The risk-return relationship in 
delayed flow.
In delayed exchange, on a strict economic level, 
the exchange is equal in "value” and neither a pure 
profit motive nor a markup over cost is involved.
Since the parties have a close, permanent, social 
relationship the risk premium is nonexistent (point D 
in Figure 2). However, even without a risk involved, 
the giver still receives a normal return (OD) on the 
investment. At some undefined point in the future, the 
recipient will return the giver with a greater gift.
In some cases an individual will give a gift without
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calculation and with no intention of collecting on the 
return; in this situation the individual either gains 
social benefits from the community, some other form of 
return on the investment, or simply the personal 
satisfaction that comes with giving a gift. In this 
case the cost of the exchange is placed on the 
individual giver and attributed to the society rather 
than the receiver of the gift. This action allows 
delayed flow exchanges to be freed from "the disruptive 
consequences of attributing the cost of social exchange 
activities to those who benefit from them" (Ekeh 
1974:47). Marcel Mauss (1925) examined exchanges of 
this type and claimed that they yield a moral code of 
behavior for society that exists outside of the 
particular exchange situation and affects all economic, 
political, and social relationships in society. 
Meillassoux (1981) points out that, legally speaking, 
children owe nothing to their mothers for raising them, 
familial (or, social) ties are what makes children repay 
(not necessarily monetarily) their debts.
The formal economic model that examines the 
effects of ceiling prices, allows one to view the 
degree of economic sacrifice that the giver of a good 
faces. This economic sacrifice equals the amount of 
personal satisfaction gained in the exchange. If an
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individual imposes a maximum price ceiling on a good, 
the effect is to cause a shortage of that good.
Clearly people always want more gifts than are 
supplied. This situation can be modeled in the 
following way.
In Figure 3, a ceiling price, Pc, is imposed on 
good X. This ceiling can be either self-imposed or set 
by the norms of the society in which the good is 
exchanged. In the case of delayed flow the price per 
unit is set at zero, which is below the equilibrium 
price Pe (charging more for the good is socially 
unacceptable). At this price, the "momentary" supply
PE
u
£  PC
XXd0 XeXs
Quantity of Good X Per Unit of Time
FIGURE 3. Effect of a ceiling price in 
delayed flow.
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is the vertical line at Xe, where only the amount Xe is 
offered. However, at this ceiling price, Xd is 
demanded. Over time the shortage increases and an 
adjustment period on the part of the supplier results 
in a decrease in the quantity supplied to X s . The 
result of this decrease in supply is excess demand 
shown in Figure 3 as XsXd. The seller must devise a 
method of allocating the limited amount of the 
product. In a delayed flow situation the supplier 
limits the availability of the products to people whom 
with he or she has permanent social relations.
Two examples that fall into this category of 
economic flow are: An exchange of gifts between close 
friends; and a mother's time spent raising her child.
In each of these examples a strong social tie exists 
prior to the economic transaction. This permanent, 
primary social relationship allows for an indefinite 
time and quantity of goods or services to exist between 
the initial flow and the reciprocal flow. In 
discussing long-term trading partnerships, Plattner 
explains that "the key element is that exchanges do not 
have to be balanced in the short run, since past or 
future short-falls are adjusted in the continuing 
stream of exchanges" (1989b:212). For example, when a 
birthday gift is given to a friend, the return flow may
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come in the form of an immediate "thank you" and a 
future gift on one's own birthday, but the secondary 
economic exchange is not stipulated by time or 
quantity. The social exchange between the parties is 
the most important aspect of the encounter. This 
situation differs from equal exchange (discussed below) 
in that the primary social relationship is close and 
permanent.
Equal Flow
Equal flow is the next point on the continuum. In 
this situation, social relations exist prior to the 
exchange but their permanency is unclear. These 
unclear social relations require an immediate economic 
exchange as opposed to an exchange with a time lag as 
described in delayed flow. Transactions are conducted 
in specific economic terms but the primary social 
relationship supports the economic transaction. This 
exchange is equal on an economic level and "pure" 
profit is not a motivating force in the exchange.
Any situation in which primary social relations 
exist and an immediate economic exchange occurs, can be 
expressed as equal flow. A situation in which gifts 
are exchanged at an annual Christmas party, can be
viewed as an example of equal flow. Buying and selling 
among friends can also be described as equal flow, if a 
pure profit motive is not involved in the transaction. 
These types of exchange are analyzed similar to delayed 
flow, by examining the risk-return relationship model 
and employing the model of the effect of a ceiling 
pr ice.
The uncertain social relations between the 
exchanging parties increases the degree of risk 
involved in the exchange. While in delayed flow the 
risk premium is nonexistent; the risk premium in equal 
flow becomes a factor. Figure 4 displays the risk 
premium involved in an equal flow situation. In equal 
flow the degree of risk is RE with the rate of return 
shown at point E. The degree of risk involved in the 
exchange is relatively low when compared to an exchange 
with a stranger.
87
Risk
PremiumEqual Flow Risk 
Premium
Delayed 
flow (Riskless) 
Rate of 
Return
RGRE
Degree of Risk
FIGURE 4. The risk-return relationship in 
equal flow.
Figure 5 displays the effects of a ceiling price 
under equal flow. The price per unit is set at the 
amount Pc, which simply covers the seller's investment 
in the production of the good and lies below the 
equilibrium price P e . This price is set by the norms 
of the group in which the exchange occurs. Since an 
excess demand XsXd exists, the only consumers who gain 
from this situation are the ones who have access to the 
limited amount of goods available. The access to goods 
is limited by the seller to his or her acquaintances 
and friends.
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FIGURE 5. Effect of a ceiling price in 
equal flow.
The amount lost in profits is gained in social 
benefits such as future access to the small exchange 
group. Thus while sellers clearly lose economically, 
in the immediate transaction where a price ceiling is 
imposed, the sellers gain in social benefits and future 
transactions where he or she becomes the buyer. It is 
clear that equal flow can only occur in a situation 
where primary social relations exist.
A key point must be stated at this time regarding 
both delayed and equal flow. When these types of flow 
are evident, the social relations underwrite thfe 
economic relations. In other words, social relations
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exist prior to the economic situation (primary social 
relationship). In his "Economic Behavior in Markets” 
Plattner calls these types of economic relationships 
"equilibrating":
I name this class of economic relationships 
"equilibrating" to call attention to these key 
features: the predominance of long- over short-run 
goals and the flexible, continuing process of 
reciprocating value in a relationship that is 
explicitly instrumental. In some circumstances 
equilibrating relationships become so strong and 
regular (that is, formalized) that they are 
described as "trading partnerships." One of the 
most significant contributions of the economic 
anthropology of markets has been the analysis of 
such relationships in the markets of 
underdeveloped societies" (Plattner 1989b:213).
For every type of exchange after this point on the 
continuum, the reverse is true; the exchange occurs 
before social relations are established (a primary 
economic or secondary social relationship). The 
economic exchange underwrites the social relations.
This line also divides the exchanges conducted without
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a pure profit motive from the exchanges that are 
motivated by pure profits.
General Flow
The next point on the continuum is general flow.
At this point, a pure profit motive drives the 
exchange. In this situation social relations are 
nonexistent prior to the exchange. Although a pure 
profit motive drives the exchange, it is necessarily an 
advantageous economic transaction for both parties.
This type of flow is common in capitalist economies, 
but also exists in precapitalist, nonmarket economies.
On an abstract level, analytical concepts about 
competition are applied to this category. While it is 
true that competition comes in many varieties, (e.g., 
pure competition, monopolistic competition, or loose 
oligopoly) it is also true that each variety serves the 
same basic role. Effective competition forces the 
economic system to perform well, or provide for low 
prices, innovation, fairness, and efficiency (Shepard 
1985).
Markets that fall into the pure competition 
category of analysis have a number of firms or 
individuals, all with negligible market shares and thus
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no influence on the market. For the purpose of, 
analysis, an ideal situation is constructed. In 
describing this ideal situation, called "perfect" 
competition, Shepard (1985:23) assumes the following:
1. Perfect knowledge by all participants of all 
relevant present and future conditions in the 
market.
2. Perfect mobility of resources and 
participants.
3. Rational behavior by all participants 
(consumers maximize utility, producers maximize 
prof its).
4. Stability of the underlying preferences, 
technology, and surroundings, so that an 
equilibrium can be reached.
5. No nonmarket interdependencies among consumers 
or among producers.
6. Pure competition on both sides of every 
market. Each firm's average costs turn up at a 
very small level, relative to the entire market, 
so that all firms have small market shares.
These assumptions can be more fully explained as 
follows. First, all participants in the market must be 
aware of prices, wage rates, costs, and other factors 
that affect the outcome of transactions. Consumers, 
for example, must be aware of all existing prices in 
order to choose the lowest price of the product.
Second, resources must be able to move freely in order 
to capture the highest rate of efficiency. This means 
that markets must be free from external controls such
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as collusion or government regulations. Third, all 
participants must behave,rationally. Assuming that 
participants have access to perfect knowledge, it is 
also assumed that they will use this knowledge 
rationally. Fourth, it must be assumed that the 
participant’s preferences, technology, and other 
influencing factors will remain constant. In order to 
isolate an existing situation, technological 
advancements and consumer preferences must be held 
constant or else market dynamics change the situation 
entirely. Fifth, all participants must act 
independently from one another. Collusion and other 
forms of dependencies are not allowed in the model of 
perfect competition. Finally, pure competition must 
exist on both the supply and demand side of the 
market. No producer or consumer has influence over 
prices. All of these assumptions guarantee a large 
market where the allocation of resources and the 
distribution of income is determined by the forces of 
supply and demand.
To maximize profits, all firms set the price of 
their product where the marginal cost (me) = marginal 
revenue (mr). Marginal cost is defined as the cost of 
producing one more unit and marginal revenue is defined 
as the amount of revenue received from selling one more
93
unit. The manager of a firm increases output until the 
added revenue from the additional unit exactly equals 
the additional cost of producing that unit. It is in 
this way that firms maximize profit.
In the perfectly competitive situation, modeled in 
figure 6 below, since the firm has no control over 
price (price taker), the firm's demand curve (which is 
also the firm's marginal revenue curve) is a horizontal 
line set at the going market price. The only choice 
that the firm must make is how much to produce. The 
amount produced is determined by the marginal cost of 
the firm. Over the long run, all firms reach the same 
output condition, and as a result, price equals 
marginal cost. In this situation, without any central 
planning, all firms must be efficient and all resources 
are used efficiently. This is what Adam Smith meant 
when he discussed the "invisible hand" of competition 
guiding the allocation of resources.
As stated above, this type of exchange is 
necessarily advantageous for both parties involved. In 
order to show that the exchange is advantageous for 
both parrties, another microeconomic model is 
employed. This model demonstrates that in a general 
flow situation, after the exchange takes place, one or 
both parties will be better off, and neither will be
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worse off. Trade will continue until no further trade 
will improve one party without making the other party 
worse off. This situation is said to be a "Pareto- 
optimal” situation.
Price 
Cost i I
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Cost
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FIGURE 6. Conditions reached under 
competition.
The Edgeworth box diagram is a technique used to 
graphically illustrate the interaction between two 
economic actors when their inputs are fixed in quantity 
(Ferguson & Gould 1975). The bilateral monopoly model 
is constructed with the following assumptions. An 
economy is divided equally among two actors, A and B,
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both of whom are allotted an amount of the goods, X and 
Y. However, the amounts of goods X and Y are unequally 
allotted between A and B.
Assuming the actors are free to exchange goods, 
the problem of exchange can be be diagrammed as in 
Figure 7. The Edgeworth box is created by constructing 
an origin for A, (Oh), and plotting quantities of the 
good X along the abscissa and good Y along the 
ordinate. A similar graph for B is constructed and 
rotated 180 degrees to the left to form the box. Next, 
we add indifference curves for A and B to the diagram, 
(labeled IA, IIA, IIIA, and IB, IIB, IIIB).
Indifference curves show different combinations of X 
and Y that yield the same level of satisfaction for the 
actors. In other words, actors are indifferent to the 
different combinations of goods along the same curve. 
Higher indifference curves yield greater levels of 
satisfaction, thus IIA represents a greater level of 
satisfaction than IA.
If we assume the initial allotment of goods is 
point D, exchange between A and B will occur for the 
following reasons. "At point D, A's marginal rate of 
substitution of X for Y, given by the slope of TT', is 
relatively high; A would be willing to sacrifice, say 
three units of Y in order to obtain one additional unit
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of X- At the same point, B has a relatively low 
marginal rate of substitution, as shown by the slope of
SS'" (Ferguson & Gould 1975:437-438). The two actors
will continue to exchange until their marginal rates of
substitution are the same.
FIGURE 7. General equilibrium of exchange.
Bilateral*monopoly analysis predicts the mix of 
goods that satisfies the two trading parties on a given 
indifference curve. The exact spot of exchange cannot 
be determined, but it will be located somewhere on the 
"contract curve” C C 1, and between the points P2 and
—  OB
YB
yB
I
P3. "The contract curve is an optimal locus in the 
sense that if the trading parties are located at some 
point not on the curve, one or both can benefit, and 
neither suffer a loss, by exchanging goods so as to 
move to a point on the curve" (Ferguson & Gould 
1975:438). The exact spot is determined by such 
factors as bargaining strengths, power, prestige, and 
haggling abilities of the individuals involved in the 
exchange.
The nonexistent social relations between the 
exchanging parties increases the degree of risk 
involved in the exchange. While in delayed and equal 
flow the risk premium is either nonexistent or minimal, 
the risk premium in general flow is a large factor. 
Figure 8 displays the risk premium involved in an 
general flow situation. Here the degree of risk is RG 
with the rate of return shown at point G. The degree 
of risk involved in the exchange is extremely high when 
compared to 1exchange with a close friend or relative.
iHying^and selling on the open market is a typical 
example of a general flow situation. Any purchase in a 
modern supermarket would fall into this category. The 
consumer purchases a good from a producer without 
having a prior social relationship. The consumer pays 
a price that he or she believes is equal to the value
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FIGURE 8. The risk-return relationship in 
general flow.
of the good purchased. Figured- into the price of the 
good is a profit that the owner of the supermarket 
receives for taking the economic risk of owning the 
store. The exchange is viewed as beneficial by both 
parties. After the exchange a social relationship may 
deve&op between the consumer and the producer, but this 
has;.:no bearing on the present economic relationship. 
Modern corporations can remain in the general exchange 
arena even after social relations have developed, since 
the corporation is an entity larger than the 
individuals involved in the actual exchange.
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Exploitative Plow
At this point on the continuum, exploitative flow, 
the exchange between the parties is unequal. While the 
flow is still two way, the economic value of the 
exchanged goods is unequal when compared to a 
competitive exchange of the same goods. The 
transaction is fueled by a pure profit motive, and 
social relations do not exist prior to the exchange.
In order to examine exploitative flow exchange, 
formal economic models of price under a monopoly are 
applied. While it is true that real world monopolies 
are difficult to find, it is also true that m^any 
markets closely approximate monopoly organization.
This model is treated as an "ideal" type similar to the 
perfect competition model employed earlier.
According to Maurice and Phillips (1986), 
monopolists have no "direct" competitors but they still 
face "indirect" competition. First, similar to all 
other products, a monopolist's commodity must compete 
with other commodities for a place in the consumer's 
budget. Secondly, as the definition of a monopoly 
implies, there are no close substitutes for the 
commodity at the price charged, but as the price of the 
commodity increases, other goods tend to become closer
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substitutes for the product. "The presence of a 
monopoly therefore depends on relative prices between 
the monopoly product and other 'poor' substitutes"
(Maurice and Phillips 1986:403). Since it is usually 
difficult to decide if a seller is a monopoly, 
economists analyze the degree of monopoly power a 
seller holds. This power is defined as the ability of 
a seller to raise the price of the product without 
loosing all sales. In a perfectly competitive 
situation if a seller increases the price of his good 
he looses all sales, thus he has no monopoly power.
Formal economic analysis of a monopoly differs 
from the analysis of a competitive firm. First, 
assuming that the monopolist wishes to maximize profits 
(a rational producer), production of the good is set 
where marginal cost equals marginal revenue, similar to 
a competitive firm. The difference, however, is that 
marginal revenue, for the monopolist, is less than the 
unit price of the good, and the seller cannot sell all 
it desires at that price. The monopoly can only 
increase sales by decreasing the price of the good.
This is a result of the fact that the monopolist, by 
definition, faces the industry demand curve since it is 
the only producer of the good. In this situation the 
demand curve must have a negative slope. The slope of
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the demand curve depends on how many substitute goods 
exist and how good the substitutes are for the product.
A measure of the relative sensitivity along a 
demand curve is described in economic terms as the 
elasticity of demand. "Demand is said to be elastic if 
revenue falls with a price increase and rises with a 
price decrease; it is inelastic if total revenue rises 
with a price increase and falls with a price decrease" 
(Maurice and Phillips 1986:21). Using this concept, 
one can measure the monopoly power of a given firm. In 
a situation where elasticity is infinite (a horizontal 
demand curve), the firm has no monopoly power (perfect 
competition). On the other hand, if the firm'.s 
elasticity is equivalent to the market's elasticity, 
the firm has the maximum attainable monopoly power.
Figure 9 (Maurice and Phillips 1986:414) 
graphically displays an equilibrium condition attained 
by a monopolist in the short-run. Similar to the 
competitive model, a maximum profit is attained when 
producing at a rate of output where marginal revenue 
(MR) equals marginal cost (SRMC). With a given demand 
curve (D), the monopolist produces x amount and charges 
price p* The total revenue earned by the monopolist is 
the rectangular area OpBx. At this level of output the 
unit cost of this amount of the good is c. The total
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cost at this level of production is the area OcDx, 
leaving a profit of cpBD.
The situation modeled below is an example of a 
monopolist earning a short-run pure profit. In reality 
a monopolist may not always earn a profit and in fact 
may incur losses. Over the long-run the monopolist is 
able to earn profits because there is no competition 
sharing the market; however, most monopolies will not 
earn pure profits because the value of the firm's 
assets increases and the returns reduce to normal.
This is what economists refer to as capitalized 
profits.
SRMC
SRAC
P
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Demand
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0
Quantity per unit of time
FIGURE 9. Short-run equilibrium under 
monopoly
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In art exploitative flow (unequal exchange) 
situation, both parties may gain from the exchange 
(Emmanuel 1972). Exploitation does not imply a one-way 
flow of material, it simply implies that one of the 
actors maintains an absolute advantage over the other.
"A saving of labor results for both parties even from 
an exchange taking place under unequal terms of trade 
when certain countries always pay less in terms of 
their own labor for the labor of others" (Cerniansky 
1959:113). It is important to remember that the 
exchanges modeled here take place without the 
consideration of power. These exchanges must be viewed 
as occuring without coersion or physical force 
(monopoly power may appear to be forcing individuals to 
exchange in some instances, but it is assumed here that 
the consumer still has alternatives, albeit poor in 
many circumstances). Exploitative flow forced on the 
consumer due to the hegemonic power of the producer is 
considered later.
An example of an exploitative situation is when a 
producer maintains a monopoly over a product. One 
modern example of a monopolistic situation is when a 
producer has a patent on a product. The patent laws of 
the United States make it possible for a person to 
obtain the exclusive right to a commodity or process
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for 17 years (Ferguson and Gould 1975). If the product 
is desired, the consumer has no choice but to purchase 
it from the only producer.
Unidirectional Flow
At this point on the continuum, the flow ceases to 
be two-way. A pure profit motive drives the flow, but 
only one party gains from it. The social relations (if 
they exist) in this situation are hostile. In this 
context, examples of the two possible situations are 
now examined.
One possible situation of economic relations 
preceding the social relations is the following. A 
group of raiders attack a ranch and steal some horses. 
Prior to the raid, the rancher and the thieves did not 
have any social relations. After the raid, the 
relations are hostile. The raiders stole the horses in 
order to achieve a one-sided economic gain. The 
economic flow was unidirectional, with the economic 
relations underwriting any hostile social relations 
that might develop at a later time.
Another situation can be illustrated with a 
continuation of the same example. Assume that the 
rancher gets a group of men together and strikes back
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at the raiders camp, retrieving his horses and some 
extra equipment. In this situation, the hostile, 
social relations exist prior to the economic 
transaction. Clearly, the answer to the question of 
which relations come first in unidirectional flow, 
depends on the particular situation.
An economic model, that can be used to predict 
when unidirectional flow will occur, is difficult to 
construct since the field of economics usually deals 
with legal exchanges. However, a model that explains 
the actions after they have occurred is rather simple 
to construct. A model of consumer optimization 
(similar to the Edgeworth Box model) is used to analyze 
the actions of a thief.
Everyone is familiar with the everyday task of 
attempting to maximize satisfaction subject to a 
limited monetary income. Figure 10 graphically 
illustrates this task. In this model, a rational 
consumer attempting to maximize satisfaction with a 
limited income is faced with dividing his or her income 
between two bundles of goods, X and Y. In order to 
maximize satisfaction, the consumer chooses the 
combination of X and Y that is on the highest 
indifference curve. The consumer, however, is 
constrained by a limited income shown in the figure as
106
the "budget line" A A ' . In this situation, the consumer 
chooses the combination of X and Y found at point P on 
indifference curve III. Recall that the point of 
consumer equilibrium (similar to the Pareto-optimal 
situation reached in the bilateral monopoly model under 
general flow) "is defined by the condition that the 
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of X for Y must 
equal the ratio of the price of X to the price of Y" 
(Maurice and Phillips 1986:147).
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FIGURE 10. Consumer optimization in 
unidirectional flow.
Let us now assume that the consumer's income falls 
to the point where he is now constrained by budget line 
B B '. It is impossible for the consumer to maintain the
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same consumption pattern with this income, without 
resorting to thievery. Stealing goods results in the 
same effect as increasing income; the budget line is 
shifted to the right back to AA'. Stealing goods helps 
the consumer maintain a particular pattern of 
consumpt i o n .
In order for a consumer to resort to this form of 
"increasing income", the predicted gains must outweigh 
the risks involved in such actions. Any social 
relations in this category of economic flow are 
necessarily hostile. Since only one party has a 
decision making capability, and one party will be made 
worse off; a Pareto-optimal solution to the allocation 
of resources is impossible. Any situation in which the 
economic gain is completely one-sided, falls into this 
unidirectional flow category.
Non-Flow
Non-flow is the extreme end of the continuum where 
economic flow ceases. In this situation the parties 
either are not aware of each other or simply do not 
interact. Although it is realized that this point 
might seem out of place on a continuum of economic 
"flow", it is also realized that the continuum must
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have an "ideal" endpoint. At this point, neither 
economic nor social relations exist.
One example of this situation is the relations 
between the old world and the new world, five thousand 
years ago. The flow between the two worlds was 
nonexistent. Another example is the relationship 
between two people passing each other on a street; each 
is aware of the other's existence but nothing flows 
between them.
Dynamic Relationships and Hegemony
Up to this point we have analyzed social and 
economic relationships in a static state. Looking at 
the first economic exchange between actors allowed us 
to construct a formal model of ideal types. As stated 
above, it is recognized that social and economic 
relationships have a dynamic quality that cannot be 
overlooked. With the theoretical model firmly 
established, adding a dynamic component to it is now a 
rather simple exercise.
A hypothetical situation in which two individuals 
with no prior social relations enter into a series of 
economic exchanges, will serve as an example to trace 
the dynamics of social and economic relationships.
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Individual A is the owner of a small hotdog cart on a 
street in the downtown section of a large city.
Individual B is a businessperson who has recently 
transferred to the city and now works in the area of 
individual A's hotdog cart. A reasonable chronology of 
events, outlined below, allows us to examine the 
changing relationship within the constraints of the 
model. The following exchange takes place in a 
situation where hegemony plays no part.
The first time individual B visits the hotdog 
cart, individual A charges, as the general flow model 
dictates, the standard price of a hotdog sold in a 
competitive environment (a number of hotdog carts 
operate in the area providing a competitive market). 
Assuming individual B likes the product provided by 
individual A, he or she begins to return on a regular 
basis. If we assume the economy is growing, and 
businesses are hiring more workers, the market for 
hotdogs in the area would be increasing, thus leading 
to higher profits. The increasing profits in the 
hotdog industry begins to lure more entrepreneurs into 
the market, increasing competition and reducing profits 
back to normal levels. In order for individual A to 
remain in the competitive market he or she begins to 
offer good customers, like individual B, a discount.
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This may reduce profits on a few sales but since a 
social relationship has been established with these 
customers the economic exchange is now at the equal 
flow level. The social relationship between the two 
individuals now becomes more important to individual A 
than the economic relationship. Individual A 
recognizes that customers standing, eating, and talking 
near the cart will draw in new customers, and begins to 
value the social relations of repeat customers (even if 
for economic reasons).
After a number of years, individual A builds up a 
reputation as an honest merchant who sells a good 
product. This reputation has led to a large market 
share, as other merchants could not attract customers.
Once individual A gains a large enough market share, 
monopoly power begins to allow for an increase in the 
price of hotdogs. Individual A has now moved to the 
exploitative flow level of exchange with new 
customers. The entrepreneur cannot, however, charge 
the exploitative price to repeat customers since the 
social relations underlie the economic relations and 
the merchant does not maintain any overwhelming power 
over where they eat (assuming that hotdogs have many 
substitutes and other foods are available in the
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area). Hegemony has played no role in this 
hypothetical situation.
The relationship between England and Colonial 
America in the eighteenth century is probably a good 
historical example of exploitative flow maintained over 
a period of time when social relations existed due to 
the hegemonic power of the mother country. The 
economic value of raw materials flowing out of America 
was unequal to the economic value of finished products 
returning from England. While social relations clearly 
existed prior to the economic relationship, primary 
economic relations underwrote any secondary social 
relations that existed because England's hegemony 
allowed the exchanges to flow on the exploitative 
level. While general flow would be predicted in a 
power free situation, the hegemonic position held by 
England allowed the exploitative situation to continue 
for many years. England, in this situation, would be 
defined as maintaining a hegemonic power factor of one 
since it was able to maintain an economic flow one 
position further out on the economic continuum than it 
would have been able to in a power-free exchange. Laws 
were enacted to favor England in the exchanges and 
since the colonies had little to say about the laws, 
they were forced to comply. If England had not held a
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hegemonic position, the colonies could have shopped 
around to find the most favorable trading partnership.
Hegemony, as defined earlier can be explained as 
the ability to maintain an economic advantage over the 
exchanging partner in a dynamic relationship without 
recourse to force. The hegemonic actor moves to a more 
profitable (exploitative), less social sphere than 
would be possible in a power-free situation. It is 
assumed that economic actors have an insatiable desire 
for power. Human communities are characterized by a 
precarious balance of power that is susceptible to 
reform as individuals, lower down in the line of power, 
find new roads to achieve greater power, and if the 
opportunity presents itself, any individual will 
attempt to gain all of the power possible to attain in 
the system (Schneider 1988). It is assumed' that human 
beings wish to exchange on the most exploitative level 
possible but social relations keep this desire in 
check. Social relations thus, tend to keep profits 
from increasing in a power-free society. Hegemony can 
be scaled based on the number of economic spheres the 
actor is able to increase over the predicted level in a 
power-free situation. The colonial situation discussed 
above is an example of a power factor of one. A 
situation where a slave, who knows his or her master on
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a fairly Close social level, and who would exchange on 
the equal flow level in a power-free relation, actually 
exchanges on the extreme edge of exploitative flow 
(possibly even on the unidirectional sphere) and is the 
victim of a power factor of 2 (or 3 if seen as 
exchanging in the unidirectional sphere). While it is 
recognized that power can originate from a number of 
sources (i.e., political, economic, military, 
ideology), this model simply deals with the effect that 
power has on exchange situations. Using this model one 
can determine the level of hegemony one actor maintains 
over the others, and levels of hegemony can be compared 
over time and space.
In a discussion of this type it is impossible to 
leave out coerced exchange. Blau discusses an example 
of coerced exchange when he writes: "An individual may 
give another money because the other stands in front of 
him with a gun in a holdup. While this could be 
conceptualized as an exchange of his money for his 
life, it seems preferable to exclude the result of 
physical coercion from the range of social conduct 
emcompassed by the term 'exchange'" (Blau 1964:91).
This exchange allowed both individuals to become better 
off than they would have been without it. However, as 
Heath points out, "although the two individuals will be
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better off than they would be if they did not carry out 
the exchange, they need not necessarily be better off 
than they were before. Indeed whether or not they are 
is a good way of defining whether it is a voluntary 
exchange or a coerced one" (Heath 1976:19).
Summary of the Model
The model of Economic Flow and Social Exchange 
provides a classification scheme for all types of 
exchange and matches them to their coinciding social 
relations. It demonstrates that as social relations 
decrease in importance, economic exchange increases in 
importance. If a primary social relationship exists, 
economic relations are not a necessary component in the 
overall relationship. If a secondary social 
relationship exists, economic relations are necessary 
for the relationship to develop. Hegemony is used to 
explain cases where economic relations do not coincide 
with their predicted social relations.
In delayed flow, a close, primary social 
relationship allows for a time lag between the initial 
and reciprocal flows. In equal flow, the primary 
social relations are semipermanent and require an 
immediate exchange. Neither of these situations
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involve a pure profit motive. Modeling risk-return 
relationships and the effects of a ceiling price 
provides for some interesting insights into exchanges 
in these categories.
Beyond equal flow, the economic relationship 
becomes primary and the exchange involves a pure profit 
motive. General flow results when two parties conduct 
an economic transaction in a competitive environment, 
without prior social relations. The economic flow in 
this situation is equal and immediate and is modeled 
using indifference analysis for the consumer and 
theories of the firm for the producer.
Table 1 displays the model in a convenient chart.
The different flow types are displayed in the first 
column on the left side of the chart. The second 
column shows the direction of the flow of goods with a 
broken arrow indicating either a time lag or a smaller 
flow of goods (notice that non-flow does not have an 
indicator arrow since there is an absence of flow).
The third column describes the type of social relations 
that accompany the corresponding economic flows. The 
last column simply provides some typical examples of 
each type of exchange relationship.
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Exploitative flow is next and is also driven by a 
pure profit motive. However, in this situation the 
flow is unequal for the parties involved. Models that 
apply to monopolies are used in this category. 
Unidirectional flow is also driven by pure profit but 
is one sided. Only one party gains from this situation 
and the social relations are necessarily hostile. The 
continuum ends with non-flow, where both exchange and 
social relations are nonexistent.
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Flow Economic Soc ia1
Cont inuum Flow Relat ions Examples
Primary social or secondary economic relationships.
Delayed Flow A B Close, 1 . Birthday
Permanent relations permanent, gifts.
allow for delayed t ime lag primary social 2 . Time spent
economic exchange. relat ionship. raising
Exchange covers ch ildren.
amount invested
Eaual Flow A B Not close but 1 . Gift exchange.
Semipermanent still friendly, 2 . Buying and
relations require semipermanent, selling among
an immediate primary social regularly
economic exchange. relationship. exchang i ng
Exchange covers part ies.
amount Invested.
Primary economic or secondary social relationships.
General Flow A B No prior 1 . Buying and
Immediate economic social selling on
exchange, driven relations. the open
by a profit motive. market.
Exchange is equal
and both parties
gain from the
transaction.
ExDloitative Flow A B No prior 1 . Some colonial
Exploitation occurs. social situations.
Prof it motive. unequa1 relat ions. 2 . Monopolist ic
Unequal exchange. situation.
Unidirectional A B Hostile 1. Stealing.
Flow relations 2. Seizure.
One-way economic
flow. One pa;£y
ga i n s .
Non Flow A B No relations 1 . Nontrad ing
No economic flow. or no contact groups.
Table 1. Economic flow and social relations 
in a power free system.
CHAPTER IV
AH EXAMINATION OF THE NETHERLANDS
Employing the Theory of Economic Flow, Social 
Exchange, and Hegemonic Relationships, one can gain a 
new perspective on the rise and fall of the Netherlands 
in the seventeenth century. Taking a regional view of 
the Netherlands operating within the larger world 
system, allows one to concentrate on the specific 
economic and social relationships it maintained with 
other political entities during its rise to the most 
powerful state in the world during the seventeenth 
century. A brief look at the historical circumstances 
leading to the rise of the Netherlands is provided as 
the starting point for the analysis.
The early economic history of the Netherlands 
(most of which centers around Holland) provides the 
background necessary to understand its rise to power.
In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, polder boards 
were formed to organize the diking of rivers to drain
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svamps, the construction of dams to protect the dikes 
(Lambert 1985), and the construction of sea walls to 
hold back the tide (Tracy 1990). After the completion 
of the diking system in the thirteenth century, 
economic expansion began. The fourteenth century saw 
the development of the agriculture and cattle 
industries (Postan 1952) and the growth of many 
important towns, which began to serve as entrepots for 
trade. By the middle of the fifteenth century the 
Dutch had important and powerful industry developed in 
cloth production, beer brewing, and fishing, and had 
established control of the Baltic trading route for 
grain imports. By the end of the century "Dutch ships 
were well known in most ports of northern Europe, 
carrying furs from Russia, wheat from Poland, cloth 
from Flanders" (Burke 1956:108).
Political Background
The complicated political history during the 
medieval period is also extremely important to the 
understanding of the Netherlands' rise to power. The 
direct line of the ruling dynasty of West Friesland 
died out in 1299 transferring the power to two 
collateral lines: the Avesnes counts of Hainaut (1299-
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1346) and the Wittelsbach dukes of Bavaria (1346-1428) 
(Tracy 1990). During this time the Netherlands was 
able to expand economically since the great powers of 
France and England were at odds with each other. A 
lull in the action, due to the peaceful reign of Louis 
IX and the internal weakness of England, set the stage 
for the massive expansion of the Netherlands (Vlekke 
1945). Also, during this time the towns began to 
expand their commercial interests and started their 
rise to economic power. In 1425, Holland was invaded 
by Duke Philip "the Good" of Burgundy, and fell in 
1428, leading to the first rule of Holland from outside 
its border. Under this rule, Holland's towns were able 
to form town councils which, over time, changed into
P
the hierarchical system of the "States of Holland."
Philip the Good died in 1467, leaving the 
leadership of the Netherlands to his son Charles "the 
Bold", who was slain ten years later in the war with 
France. The death of Charles left his daughter Mary in 
control of the state. Facing revolts, Mary implored 
Maximilian of Habsburg, to whom she was betrothed by 
her father, to come to the Netherlands (Hugenholtz 
1964). Upon his arrival, Maximilian controlled 
Burgundy, Austria, and now the Netherlands. His son 
Philip took power in 1494, and then in 1496 wed
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Johanna, the daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella of 
Spain. It was then Charles, the eldest son of Philip 
and Johanna, who became Duke of Burgundy in 1515,
Charles V of Spain in 1516, and upon Maximilian’s death 
in 1519, Holy Roman Emperor and ruler of Austria 
(Kennedy 1987). Charles ruled the Netherlands until 
1555 when his successor, Philip II, took power and 
ruled until the revolt of the Netherlands in 1568, led 
by William "The Silent", Prince of Orange, marking the 
beginning of the Eighty Years War. By the seventeenth 
century the native nobility, still residing in the 
Netherlands, had lost most of its political power to 
the merchants and according to Price (1974) the 
nobility had very little influence even in the 
economic, social and cultural spheres.
Before proceeding to the revolt, a quick note must 
be made of the Reformation and its impact on the 
Netherlands. The Habsburg's were loyal to the old 
church and in 1520 Charles issued an edict against 
heresy in the Netherlands. The Inquisition began in 
1523 and between 2,000 and 3,000 heretics were martyred 
between 1523 and 1566 (Schoffer 1964). Although the 
population was not overwhelmingly against the 
Inquisition at first, Calvinism was becoming an 
important force, and in the 1560s the Netherlands began
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to receive refugees from Spain and other countries.
The Inquisition, coupled with increased meddling with 
the Dutch economy and increasing taxes, was a major 
contributor to the first revolts in 1566.
The Revolt
In response to the revolts in 1566, Philip sent 
the Duke of Alva to act as Governor and put down the 
riots. A number of factors, when added together, serve 
to explain Spain's trouble in putting down the revolt. 
First, during the Habsburg rule the Dutch merchant 
fleet was able to trade throughout the Mediterranean, 
and trade was started with the East (1602) and West 
(1621) Indies. One of the many rewards of this trade 
was the experience gained in shipbuilding atnd 
seamanship. Second, the northern provinces were very 
defensible since dikes could be opened to flood 
attacking troops. Third, Spain, the most powerful 
state in the world, had a number of powerful enemies 
occupying a good number of its troops in other wars. 
Finally, the Dutch were very determined to defend their 
country against attack. All of these factors 
contributed to the length of the war with Spain (Parker 
1979). Treaties with other powers began to play a part
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in the war in 1585 when England agreed to provide 
support to the Netherlands. The most important factor, 
however, was the massive economic development, from 
1590 onwards, of the maritime trade of Holland and 
Zeeland (Boxer 1965).
It was early in the sixteenth Century when the 
power of the Netherlands began to take shape. Modern 
capitalism was beginning its expansion into the areas 
of the globe opened up by the age of discovery, markets 
were expanding, transportation and travel was becoming 
safe and political consolidation had stimulated 
overseas trade (Barbour 1950). Growth can also be 
attributed to the fact that England and France had not 
yet instituted damaging mercantilist policies 
(Wallerstein 1974).
Partially reflecting the fact that the Netherlands 
was in a favorable location on the European trade route 
(Wallace 1990), the merchants of the maritime provinces 
already had a major share of the trade between Western 
Europe and the Baltic by the middle of the sixteenth 
century and, as a result, the political power of the 
merchants and mariners was increasing (Boxer 1965).
When war broke out, overseas trade increased [including 
trade with Spain (Braudel 1966)1, further adding to the 
merchant's power. This power "enabled them to use the
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town councils for the purpose of fostering the 
development of trade and industry in the towns at the
expense of the home and cottage industries of the
countryside" (Boxer 1965:11).
Amsterdam
"Each town in Holland had its own special 
character, each its own history, political organization 
and economic activity" (Roorda 1964:117). The domestic 
political terms were supposedly equal; however,
Amsterdam, which paid one-third of the expenses of 
Holland, clearly had more influence in the province 
(Wansink 1971). Each town concentrated its political 
activity on the main industry operating in the area.
The ruling class tended to be merchants who acted to 
serve other merchants. The actions of the ruling class
were generally oriented toward free trade. While the
East and West India companies were instrumental in 
bringing the Netherlands to power, the lack of 
restrictions and the absence of state interference 
played the greatest role (Huizinga 1968). The 
political disunity was a major disadvantage for the 
Netherlands during the first decade of the war, and it 
was not until 1578 that Amsterdam joined in the cause.
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After the fall of Antwerp in 1559, Amsterdam 
became the center of economic power. The city served 
as an entrepot for trade, a center for banking, and the 
center for shipbuilding (Wallerstein 1974). Ships were 
constructed cheaply using the finances of numerous 
shareholders. Between 1580 and 1604, 1083 persons were 
engaged in shipbuilding (Murray 1967:57). One of the 
most important inventions for the industry was the 
sawmill, to which the original inventors had monopoly 
rights from 1589-1619. After the monopoly expired, 
sawmills increased and by 1665 there were 74 mills 
operational in Amsterdam alone (Murray 1967).
Reflecting the general attitude toward free trade, the 
shipbuilders sold ships to fellow Amsterdamers, other 
merchants, and foreign governments including those with 
which the Netherlands was at war (Barbour 1950).
The enormously profitable Baltic grain trade led 
to increasing riches and a large banking industry. The 
Exchange Bank of Amsterdam was created in 1609 and its 
functions were typical for capitalist economies of the 
day: the purchase of bullion from states such as Spain, 
holding of deposits, exchanging money, and transferring 
accounts (Van Dillen 1934). While lending was not a 
major function of the bank, it did extend credit to the 
city of Amsterdam, The Lending Bank of Amsterdam, and
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the East India Company (Barbour 1950). In 1621 private 
banks appeared on the scene and competed with the 
Exchange Bank. The private banks, however, were not 
nearly as successful as the Exchange Bank and were 
often ruined in times of war (Murray 1967).
The Baltic trade was the key to the expansion; 
merchants purchased the grain cheap, transported it in 
cargo ships called flutes (20% smaller than other ships 
of equal tonnage and able to be handled by a small crew 
(Braudel 1984)), and stored it until the price went up, 
at which time they sold it for large profits (Cotterell 
1972). Grain shortages in Italy and Spain in the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries created even 
larger profits for the Dutch, who were well stocked 
with Baltic grain and could act as a monopolist 
supplier (Van Dillen 1962).
The Eighty Years War was temporarily halted in 
1609, when a 12 year truce was signed. During this 
truce the Dutch continued to gain in economic power and 
when hostilities resumed in 1621 the struggle was 
evenly matched. The war officially ended with the 
Peace of Munster in 1648. The Netherlands had emerged 
from the conflict having fought off the most powerful 
empire in Europe and gained a great deal of land in the 
process (Lambert 1985).
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Factors leading to growth
While a number of factors leading to the growth in 
power of the Netherlands in the seventeenth century 
have already been discussed, many other factors can 
also be figured into the equation. When the price of 
grain dropped, intensive agriculture rapidly expanded 
due to increased poldering (pumping water out to create 
land), thus keeping the domestic peasants and farmers 
alive and in business (Van Veen 1950). Peasants also 
shifted their crops from grain to industrial crops like 
flax, hemp,, and hops (De Vries 1974). Sugar refining 
also became a very important industry in Holland. Most 
of the sugar bound for England and France was refined 
in Holland where Amsterdam alone had 60 refineries in 
1661 (Masefield 1967). Insurance was another industry 
that grew along with trade. This industry was 
extremely large and so unregulated that during the war 
with Spain it even insured enemy ships (a practice 
halted by regulation in 1622) (Barbour 1950). Finally, 
the massive growth rate and the dream of freedom from 
religious persecution drew large numbers of immigrants 
from other countries and artisans from the countryside 
into the cities and filled the demand for labor (the
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population of Amsterdam went from 50,000 in 1600 to 
200,000 in 1660) (Wallerstein 1980).
An interesting note can be made of the problems 
associated with the Netherlands' main factor leading to 
growth: the Baltic grain. Exports from the Baltic 
states far exceeded the imports, meaning that the 
traders were required to bring a large amount of silver 
to the Baltic. Trade with Spain, the leading producer 
of silver, thus had to be maintained even during the 
Eighty Years War. Later in the seventeenth century, 
after the Dutch had established trade routes to areas 
that could supply the Baltics with the products it 
demanded (spices, tea, tobacco, sugar) all of this 
changed and the Dutch sailed with goods rather than 
bullion, effectively negating the need for the Spanish 
trade (De Vries 1976).
The Trading Companies
One of the most important political and economic 
decisions the Netherlands made was the organization of 
the East and West Indies trading companies. The East 
Indies Company, chartered in 1602, and the West Indies 
Company, chartered in 1621 (the West Indies company 
would have been chartered earlier but the 12 year truce
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was signed and the need for the company was lessened), 
served as trading companies, colonizers, investment 
opportunities, and war machines (Boxer 1965;
Wallerstein 1980). A brief discussion of each of these 
powerful trading companies is necessary to stress their 
importance to the Dutch empire.
The United East India Company (VOC) was founded in 
1602 in order to secure a monopoly in Asia against 
other merchants in the Netherlands, but the company 
eventually tried to get the monopoly over the Europeans 
and the Asians (Mei1ink-Roelofsz 1968). Along with 
monopoly rights the state granted the Company the right 
to make war (the Company was partly designed to aid in 
the war against Spain). In the Company's early years 
its territory was limited to Banda, Amboina, and 
Formosa (Mei1ink-Roelofsz 1968). The Netherlands, 
however, did have significant trade routes in the 
Mediterranean and the Atlantic (Americas and Africa), 
and later in Ceylon, Java, and Japan (Nagasaki).
The West India Company, organized in the northern 
provinces (Amsterdam, however, had the most voting 
rights) in 1621, was much less successful than its 
counterpart. The main reason for establishing the 
company was to wage war against the Spanish; colonizing 
and trading came second (Goslinga 1971). In the first
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25 years the Company established New Amsterdam (New 
York), captured, with a great deal of resistance, a 
large portion of Brazil, and then Elmina (West Africa) 
and Luanda (Angola) (Wallerstein 1980). Brazil was 
chosen as the first major project for the company since 
it was controlled by the less powerful Portuguese, and 
had a sugar industry that was thought to be large 
enough to pay for the costs of taking and establishing 
the colony (Boxer 1957). Another important factor in 
the decision to attempt to control Brazil were the 
large salt reserves discovered there after the salt 
trade with Spain became dangerous in 1585. Salt was 
one of the main imports critical to the success of the 
fishing industry. Salt was needed, due to the new 
method discovered by the Dutch in the middle of 
fifteenth century, to cure the herring (Goslinga 1979).
The most important victory for the company, 
however, came in 1628, when it captured the Spanish 
silver fleet and paid its investors a 75% dividend that 
year (Van Hoboken 1960). Once the company had 
established the Atlantic routes, the Dutch started what 
has come to be known as the triangle trade. Slaves 
from Africa worked the plantations in the West Indies, 
which then supplied Europe with sugar, tobacco, rum, 
and cotton. In 1638 the Brazil monopoly was lost to a
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vote for free trade, but its power was still dominant 
until 1654 when it lost out to the Portuguese (the 
Dutch were involved in the first war with England at 
the time). According to Van Hoboken (1960), the 
company never recovered from the loss of Brazil, and 
was liquidated in 1674. A new company was organized 
but never had much power or economic strength.
The World System
Fernand Braudel (1977) claims the world system in 
1650 had the following composition.
The center of the world was tiny Holland, or to be 
more accurate, Amsterdam. The intermediate or 
secondary zones were the very active remainder of 
Europe, that is, the Baltic and North Sea states, 
England, the Rhine and Elbe regions of Germany, 
France, Portugal, Spain, and Italy north of Rome.
The peripheral regions were Scotland, Ireland, and 
Scandinavia to the north; plus all of Europe east 
of a line running from Hamburg to Venice; Italy 
south of Rome (Naples and Sicily); and lastly 
beyond the Atlantic, Europeanized America, the 
periphery par excellence (Braudel 1977:91).
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The Netherlands had attained the ability to compete in 
the markets of other core countries and through 
political and economic means, kept the prices of raw 
materials coming into the country at low levels 
(Wallerstein 1974). By 1670, the Dutch had more ships 
than all of the other major countries combined 
(Wallerstein 1980).
The first seeds of the decline of the Dutch 
republic were sewn in 1651, when England passed the 
Navigation Acts, marking the first of the mercantilist 
policies aimed at eroding Dutch hegemony (Harper 
1939). By 1672 the Netherlands were involved in the 
third Anglo-Dutch war and a separate war with France 
(Wallerstein 1980). Increasing military costs as well 
as low grain prices started to push the Netherlands 
into decline. The other powers in Europe had correctly 
perceived the Netherlands as the economic (and often 
military) enemy and enacted a number laws and other 
political devices to cut into its power. The weak 
neighbors that had helped the Netherlands gain a 
hegemonic position were now strong and establishing 
their own hegemony (Huizinga 1968). While power was 
fading it was by no means gone, and the Netherlands 
remained the dominant power until 1700, when the war in
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Europe forced them to fight and give up their hegemonic 
position.
Employing the Model in the Early Years
Looking at the changing position of the 
Netherlands, within the framework of the model, sheds 
new light on its political and economic relations with 
other states. While under the protection of other 
empires (Burgundy and Spain) the Netherlands was able 
to construct an infrastructure that could facilitate 
the growth of later years. During Burgundian rule, the 
Netherlands enjoyed an unusually free political 
environment in which to conduct economic activities.
The town councils formed during the period also 
facilitated the growth of towns and independent rule.
When Charles "the Bold" took power his policies changed 
the free environment to one of harsh rule. Charles 
increased the role of the central government and raised 
taxes. Reaction to Charles's new rules was divided, 
however, since most of the taxes and policies were 
directed toward the guildsmen leaving the rest of the 
town unaffected. The negative reaction did not spread 
since the Baltic grain trade, the herring industry, 
cloth production, and the beer brewing industry, were
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supplying a good amount of wealth to the provinces and 
served to counter the higher taxes (Tracy 1990).
Another factor that divided the provinces was the 
fiscal negotiations with the government. Town councils 
could negotiate how much taxes were paid and the more 
prosperous towns had better bargaining positions.
Charles the Bold’s reign ended in 1477 and the 
harsh policies were slightly relaxed by Mary. Economic 
decline began around 1480, and poor weather conditions 
combined with the war against the city of Utrecht (1481- 
1484) put the provinces into severe economic hardship 
(Tracy 1990). The cloth industry suffered since credit 
was denied to the them by the English from whom they 
received their wool. The beer brewing industry was 
also hit hard due to increased competition from 
Germany. Even the normally strong Baltic trade had 
diminished due to conflicts in the region.
In 1494 Philip, at the of age 14, took the reins 
of government and was heavily influenced by the 
Netherlands and the higher aristocracy (Vlekke 1945). 
During these last decades of the fifteenth century the 
provinces started to develop a "national" policy and 
Philip's political ideas began to reflect this 
development (Hugenholtz 1964). Wars were brought to an 
end and trade routes were reinstated. All of this
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began to change, however, when Philip married Johanna 
in 1496; and all other heirs to the Spanish throne died 
in 1500. The advantageous trade relationships 
established with England were scrapped as Philip tried 
to secure England as an ally against France. Many 
other policies advantageous for the Netherlands were 
similarly dropped as Philip set his sights on a 
dynasty. Philip died in 1506, leaving the empire to 
Gharles.
Charles gave legal status to the United Provinces 
and established the borders which, for the most part, 
survive to this day (Vlekke 1945). Uniting the 
Provinces proved difficult (a 40 year war) and stirred 
a great deal of anti-Habsburg feelings. Early in the 
sixteenth century the heavy tax burden was reinstated 
and steps to eradicate Protestantism were taken, 
planting the seeds of revolt (Burke 1956).
The Netherlands, oscillating between exploitative 
and general economic flow with Spain during the 
fifteenth century, began to develop anti-Habsburg 
feelings and the desire to have control over their own 
political and economic destiny. Determining social 
relations based on the economic flow would lead one to 
predict that no social relations existed prior to the 
economic exchange. Since this is clearly not the case,
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a hegemonic relationship is indicated. Since social 
relations existed prior to the exchange the economic 
flow should have taken place on the equal level.
Originally on the receiving end of exploitative 
economic flow the provinces faced a hegemonic power 
factor of two. Reaction to the exploitative relations 
was kept to a minimum due to policies aimed at dividing 
the population, which was a fairly easy task since a 
civil war had been raging for a number of years, and an 
overall level of economic prosperity in the Provinces.
In order to model specific economic exchanges during 
this period, neoclassical microeconomic models of 
monopolistic price setting would necessarily 
employed.
As political and economic policies eased, and the 
Netherlands gained in economic power, the economic 
exchange shifted to the general flow level. We spot 
the historical discontinuities as models of 
monopolistic exchange begin to fail. These 
discontinuities can be placed where policy changes 
resulted in lower taxes and easier import/export 
activity. Models that examine competitive markets 
would better explain these periods of exchange. The 
winds of change began to blow in the last decades of
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the fifteenth century and the Netherlands started its 
rise to power shortly thereafter.
Sixteenth Century Power Shifts
Although unquestionably the most dominant state in 
western Europe, the hegemonic position of Spain began 
to fade during the sixteenth century (Parker 1979).
Even though the Habsburg empire continued to grow and 
consolidate due to marriages and deaths, wars with 
France (Franco-Spanish wars of 1494-1516 and the 
Habsburg-Valois rivalry of 1494-1559), and 
overextension had drained some of the economic strength 
of Spain (Wallerstein 1974). The Treaty of Cateau- 
Cambresis (1559) settled the rivalry and Spain emerged 
the most dominant power in Europe (Endress 1975). The 
war with France was not over for more than a year when 
Philip decided to attack the Turks in Tripoli. This 
campaign cost Philip a good portion of his galley fleet 
and damaged Spain’s reputation (Parker 1979). Although 
victorious in the end, the period in which Spain was 
occupied with other wars opened the door of opportunity 
for the Netherlands and from this point Spain’s 
hegemony would begin to fade.
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The extent of the Habsburg empire provided massive 
trade opportunities for the merchants of the 
Netherlands (Lambert 1985). Growth was still held 
back, however, due to the civil war draining the 
economic gains made in trade. When the war ended in 
1543, the Netherlands pushed past another barrier 
toward economic hegemony. With internal peace came 
economic prosperity. Every industry showed signs of 
growth leading to an increase in population that 
quickly outpaced farm production. It became clear that 
more land was necessary to support the growing 
population. Towns began to band together to conduct 
land reclamation projects to large for independent 
towns to handle (Vlekke 1945). Even with these 
projects it was clear that the country was not able to 
support its population. Trade became even more 
critical to the Netherlands' survival. With decreasing 
internal problems, the Netherlands began to focus on 
the fact that it was being taxed and controlled by a 
power that was concerned only with itself. In 
addition, Calvinism had spread across the Netherlands 
and the Inquisition (1523-1566) was adding to the 
unrest (Schoffer 1964).
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From the beginning of the sixteenth century, the 
Netherlands was able to operate in a fairly free 
international market. While Spain was occupied with 
external enemies, the Netherlands was establishing a 
foothold in many industries and by the middle of the 
century it had gained a good deal of economic power.
While still paying taxes to Spain, the Netherlands had 
moved from being in an exploitative economic flow 
situation to trading on the general flow level. Spain 
still maintained a power factor of one over the 
Netherlands but this power was fading fast.
Analyzing the Revolt
By the time of the revolt (1566) the Netherlands 
had secured a strong position in the world market and 
controlled most of the Baltic grain trade. Warning 
signs concerning the revolt had come to Spain around 
1559, and Philip II dispatched the Duke of Alva to deal 
with the situation (Wegg 1924). In 1570, however, the 
Turks had gone on the offensive, and Philip was forced 
to shift his resources to concentrate on the 
Mediterranean trade and the war with the Turks (Parker
1979). The two front war between 1572 and 1576 cost 
Spain a great deal of revenue and resulted in Philip
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deciding to make peace with the Turks. Concentration 
on the Netherlands lasted only two years, however, 
since the king of Portugal died in 1578, leaving Philip 
II as the heir. Annexing Portugal took four years and 
drew the best troops out of the Netherlands. During 
that time Amsterdam, which had stayed out of the fight 
against Spain, decided it was now economically 
advantageous to join (Lambert 1985).
In 1585, Antwerp fell to Philip creating the 
opportunity for Amsterdam to assume the role of leading 
the Netherlands (Wegg 1924). Trade was already strong 
in Amsterdam when many of the merchants from Antwerp 
moved in and brought their trading-relations with them 
(Van Dillen 1964). Merchants and traders who were 
thrown out of Portugal and Spain, and German Jews also 
found refuge in Amsterdam (Cotterell 1972). With trade 
expanding rapidly, the alliance with England (1585) and 
the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, and the bad 
harvests of 1586-1590 driving grain prices up, the 
Netherlands were in good economic shape (Boxer 1965).
While the war continued, Amsterdam traders, seeing that 
profits could be made, continued to do business with 
both sides. Storing grain in large warehouses until 
the price went up allowed the merchants to reap 
enormous profits during the widespread famine of the
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last decade of the century (Cotterell 1972). Heading 
into the seventeenth century, the Netherlands were 
building up the economic strength to become a hegemonic 
power.
During the early years of the rebellion, Spain's 
resources were divided for a number of other factors.
While united, Spain was able to crush the rebellion, 
but these times of unity were few and far between, 
allowing the Netherlands time to rebuild and gain 
allies. By the time Amsterdam joined in the rebellion, 
Spain had clearly lost its ability to exploit the 
Netherlands and was now forced to compete with it on 
the general flow level of exchange. While the traders 
had social relations with each other, the motive 
driving the exchange was a desire for pure profits and 
thus the exchange took place on the general level with 
a power factor of one. The Netherlands controlled a 
large portion of the grain trade, but not enough to 
significantly affect the price level on the world 
market. Spain and the Netherlands both had the option 
of trading with other states for their goods. This 
situation changed just after the turn of the century, 
and we examine this historical discontinuity below.
The Golden Age of the Netherlands
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The first decade of the seventeenth century marked 
the true beginning of Dutch power in the world 
economy*. While Spain and other powers of western 
Europe were concerned with dominating the continent, 
the Netherlands was concerned with dominating trade. 
Originally the Dutch seafarers were masters of 
transporting grain, salt, and timber (i.e. high volume, 
low value goods), but when they began shipping cloth, 
spices, and silks, their skills truly shined. The 
development of the "fluit” led to a ship that could 
carry a large volume of cargo at relatively cheap 
operating costs (De Vries 1976). These ships were also 
specialized for transporting cargo. The Netherlands 
expanded on the assumption that they would trade 
peacefully with other states and, thus, the ships did 
not have to double as naval vessels. When the ships 
sailed into areas of danger due to war or piracy, the 
ships were sent as part of a larger convoy that 
included naval vessels.
Establishing monopolistic trading companies in the 
East and West Indies led to an even more powerful 
trading empire. The Netherlands had built their empire 
by maintaining monopolistic power throughout the wars
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involving other states and itself. Once the 12 year 
truce with Spain was signed (1609) the Netherlands, 
already the dominant force in trade, could fully 
concentrate on establishing economic hegemony. The 
truce was essentially the end of the war, although it 
was not formalized until 1648, Spain had essentially 
given up on the hope of keeping the Netherlands. By 
the end of the truce, monopolies in grain, herring, 
spices, furs, copper, and a number of other commodities 
were established, and the goal of hegemony had been 
achieved. The key to the monopolies was the huge 
warehouses where the goods could be stored until the 
prices were high. Amsterdam merchants stuffed their 
four and five story warehouses full of goods and made 
phenomenal profits during wars, when the commodities 
were scarce (Braudel 1982). Dutch hegemony would reach 
its peak at midcentury.
Without the problem of war, the Netherlands had 
passed the final barrier to economic power. With 
established monopolies in a number of industries, the 
Dutch could manipulate prices and control the supply of 
goods to the world. Exploitative flow models once 
again can be used to explain the economic situation; 
however, this time the state doing the exploiting is 
the Netherlands. While social relationships were
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clearly established with trading partners, the 
monopolistic situation allowed the Dutch to trade on a 
more exploitative level. At the peak of hegemony, the 
Netherlands maintained a power factor of two with the 
other European states, demonstrating the fact that it 
had monopolies in most industries and, most 
importantly, that it had monopolized trade. The 
Netherlands possibly maintained a power factor of three 
in its peripheral colonies in the east and west Indies, 
reflecting its overpowering military and economic 
strength in those regions.
The historical discontinuity can be placed in the 
year 1609, the year the truce with Spain was signed. 
Without the burden of war, the Netherlands was free to 
complete its economic domination of the world. Models 
of competitive markets fail to accurately explain the 
exchanges that took place after this year, and 
monopolistic exchange models begin to show promise.
The model of exploitative flow explains the exchanges 
taking place within western Europe and in certain areas 
of the east and west Indies, unidirectional flow models 
fit best. These models serve to explain the hegemony 
of the Netherlands until its decline at the close of 
the seventeenth century.
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The Decline o£ the Netherlands
Hegemony of the Netherlands started to erode when
other states began to perceive them as the enemy and
c
the wars in Europe started coming to an end. The first 
act that cut into the hegemonic power of the 
Netherlands was the English Navigation Act of 1651.
The peace with Spain and the end of the Thirty Years 
War brought the cold wars into play (Wallerstein
1980). With fewer wars to fight other countries began 
to focus on economics, and the Netherlands began to 
feel the pinch. Three separate sea battles were fought 
with England in response to mercantilist acts passed to 
counter Dutch hegemony. Although Dutch hegemony 
remained until the end of the seventeenth century, 
England and France’s recognition of the Netherlands as 
the force that had to be reckoned with, cut into its 
power.
During its reign of hegemony the Netherlands 
followed a path of neutrality in order to foster the 
best trading arrangements. Once its economic power had 
established it as the most powerful state in the world 
this policy was forced, by other states, to change 
(Carter 1975). The policies and wars of France and 
England against the Netherlands had done their damage;
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and the Dutch, who consider themselves a peaceful 
people (Huizinga 1968), were content to return to a 
semiperipheral state of existence.
Final Thoughts
While many volumes have been written on the rise 
and fall of the Netherlands, this thesis has barely 
scratched the surface of these historical changes.
This thesis has, however, placed the history of the 
Netherlands within a new framework of social and 
economic exchange that incorporates hegemonic relations 
between trading partners. The model, constructed in 
Section III, has shed new light on the social, 
economic, and political dynamics of the Netherlands 
within the larger world system. Historical 
discontinuities are placed at the specific dates where 
particular economic models begin to fail. Employing 
the model allows one to identify five main economic 
periods for the Netherlands during the years examined 
in this paper. During the early years, the Netherlands 
went through a series of general flow - exploitative 
flow, oscilations in its relationship with Spain. The 
second period lasted until 1543 when the internal civil 
wars ended and allowed the Netherlands to concentrate
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on economic matters. The rise to power occured between 
1566 and 1609 when the revolt broke off friendly social 
relations with Spain. The "Golden Age" of the 
Netherlands lasted from 1609 to 1651. During this 
period, the rise to hegemonic power allowed 
exploitative and possibly unidirectional economic flow 
to occur and the Netherlands reached a power factor of 
three with its heavily exploited periphery. Finally, 
the decline period is placed from 1651 to 1700. While 
hegemonic relations continued in this period, a 
noticable decline in power occurs, and England and 
France begin to make inroads into the Netherlands1 
power.
The general review of economic and political 
history has allowed the historical situation of the 
Netherlands to be placed within the Model of Economic 
flow, Social exchange, and Hegemonic Relationships.
While specific price data were not incorporated into 
this example, I am confident that prices between 
trading partners would reflect the conditions outlined 
above. A brief example of how price data can be used 
within the framework of the model is outlined below in 
Section V, where the model is applied to Mesopotamian 
evidence.
CHAPTER V
APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO MESOPOTAMIAN EVIDENCE
While the model showed a great deal of promise in 
its application to the shifts in power of the 
Netherlands, it is important to show that other 
applications are possible. While a full scale analysis 
of Mesopotamian trade systems is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, a brief examination of some data that 
appears to be troubling archaeologists, within the 
context of the model, may help explain the situation. 
Adding sophistication to evidence provided by Daniel 
Snell (1982) concerning price stability allows one to 
gain a better understanding of the problem and what 
sort of data is needed to solve it.
According to Snell "the motivations of the 
[Mesopotamian] price-setters in changing their prices 
or in keeping them stable elude us” (1982:190). This 
and other similar statements leads one to the 
conclusion that there is much to learn about the
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Mesopotamian economy. Mesopotamian evidence is 
specifically evaluated here for the following reasons: 
First, the question of whether or not Mesopotamia 
operated under the market principle or not is still a 
topic of debate; second, interesting problems about 
price variability are plaguing archaeologists; third, 
price data is available in the quantity necessary to 
generate some interesting hypotheses; and finally, the 
General Theory of Economic Flow, Social Exchange, and 
Hegemonic Relationships is capable of addressing the 
data. Price variability is the main concern of this 
examination but the other issues are also addressed.
Since 1957, when Karl Polanyi challenged the 
market concept, scholars in the fields of economic 
anthropology and archaeology have spent a good deal of 
time attempting to prove that a market did in fact 
exist in ancient Mesopotamia (see especially Cook 1966, 
Veenhof 1972, and Snell 1982). Scholars have failed to 
directly attack Polanyi’s theory and its applicability 
to Mesopotamian evidence. Most critics attack one of 
Polanyi's weakest points: that since no physical 
evidence exists for a "market place”, Mesopotamia could 
not have operated under a market principle (Polanyi 
1957).
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The dependent relationship, which Polanyi 
stresses, between the existence of a "market place" and 
the operations of a free market, is false. Veenhof 
(1972:351) correctly points out that Polanyi's 
assumption of the interrelatedness of the "market 
place" and the market is incorrect. In other words, 
the absence of a "market place" does not dismiss the 
possibility of the economy operating under the market 
principle. Trade can occur in households, squares, or 
on the street. An important point to keep in mind 
regarding the fact that archaeologists have not found a 
"market place" is that archaeologists rarely excavate 
in open spaces. Structures and other features are 
relatively easy to spot, and with limited funds 
available to the archaeologist, he or she is not like! 
to spend time excavating open spaces. In the broadest 
sense, however, the "market" can be viewed as rational 
individuals attempting to maximize their utility 
through exchange with other individuals who are 
attempting to maximize their own utility. Even if
* i
material goods did not physically change hands 
according to the principles of a free market in a 
market place, social exchange and rational actions on 
the part of individuals and firms cannot be dismissed 
by Polanyi.
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After Veenhof's argument against Polanyi, he goes 
on to claim that markets did in fact exist in 
Mesopotamia. "The fact however that markets existed 
where goods could be sold with profit (nemelum) does 
not fit well into POLANYI'S system" (Veenhof 1972:356), 
(see also Foster 1977). While this argument is 
important, it fails to attack the heart of Polanyi's 
theory. The current model exposes the limitations of 
Polanyi's theory and also demonstrates the existence of 
a market economy by exposing the reasons for price 
stability and instability. Before the model can be 
applied to the evidence on price variability a critical 
assumption must be reviewed. ^
One of the main principles of the general theory 
is that as social relations decrease, the desire to 
attain a pure profit from the exchange increases. The 
assumption, which must be made in order for the 
Mesopotamian price data to apply, is that social 
relations decline with an increase in geographic 
di&tance. This assumption is convincingly supported by 
Hodder (1978) in his analysis of artifact distribution 
and the effect of distance on human interaction. He 
claims that as distance increases from a center, the 
amount of interaction with that center decreases.
Hodder concludes that "especially when communication is
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pedestrian, most interaction is limited to nearby 
meetings" (1978:157). If one excludes relationships 
with kin living in other cities, it is safe to assume 
that in a society where communication is pedestrian 
(i.e. Mesopotamia during the Ur III period), social 
relations at the intercity level are generally more 
exploitative than social relations at the intracity 
level. The assumption of no hegemony must also be made 
in order to set up the ideal categories of economic 
flow discussed in Section III. With these assumptions 
in mind, we can now proceed to analyze unstable prices 
in Mesopotamia.
Analysis o£ Unstable Prices
Although investigations of the Ur III period 
evidence are limited and incomplete (almost no private 
economic documents exist from the Ur III period while 
thousands of state records exist), they do appear to 
demonstrate that prices on a range of goods were stable 
within cities and unstable between cities (Snell 
1982:189-196). These price trends are both predicted 
and explained by the present theory. The unstable 
price trend in intercity exchange is now explained.
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Daniel Snell's discussion of unstable prices 
states that trends are difficult to find and that "much 
more remains to be discovered about the economic life 
of Ur III times before the full significance of pricing 
and price movements can be understood" (Ibid 
1982:196). Again, application of the Theory of 
Economic Flow, Social Exchange, and Hegemonic 
Relationships explains these price fluctuations as a 
consequence of different merchant risks and market 
structures.
According to Snell (1982), goods of foreign origin 
display irregular prices. The argument presented here 
is that irregular or unstable prices indicate the 
merchant's attempt to capture a pure profit from goods 
exchanged between cities. Initial social relations in 
an intercity exchange are nonexistent and the primary 
economic relationship is at either the exploitative or 
general level, depending on the type of good, 
competition, supply and demand, and a number of other 
factors. The profit attained from the transaction 
would cover, among other things, the added risk 
involved in transporting goods between cities.
Clearly, long-run prices between a particular merchant 
and his steady clientele will exhibit more stability. 
However, this stability only develops after social
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relations have been established and the economic 
relationship has become secondary to the social 
relationship. Prices on goods produced and sold within 
a city should, based on this theory, exhibit more 
stability in both the short and long-run.
Irregular prices arise, in part, from the fact 
that imported goods arrive from a number of different 
locations, each with different risks involved in the 
trade. The risk involved with transporting goods to 
market increases with geographic distance for a number 
of reasons: perishable goods that may not survive a
long trip; an increased possibility of theft; poor 
demand for the product at the destination; and many 
other factors. Thus, a good imported from a greater 
distance will display a greater price than that same 
good imported from a closer location. The instability 
of prices is a reflection of the different risk-return 
schedules, illustrated in Figure 11, demanded by the 
merchants.
Another reason goods of foreign origin display 
unstable prices is that the social relations can be at 
either the general or the exploitative level, and in 
the long-run these relations may move to the equal 
level. As a result of the multitude of undefined and 
different social relations involved in the exchanges
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geographically different merchants.
analyzed by Snell, a relative price scheme cannot be 
generated. The result of the price analysis of goods 
arriving from different, undefined locations, with 
undetermined social relations involved, is what appears 
to be unstable or irregular prices.
A merchant who has, in the long-run, established a 
steady customer in another city would predictably 
engage in an equal flow exchange of goods. In this 
situation he may establish a price ceiling on his good 
in order to express good faith, friendship, or thanks
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for the customer's continued patronage. On the other 
hand, if the economic relationship remains primary, the 
merchant will continue attempting to reap a pure profit 
from the exchange. The price in this situation is 
determined by the market forces and costs of 
production.
Merchants who travel great distances to sell an 
exotic product are able to fetch a higher price because 
the product is only available in limited quantities, 
and thus the merchant maintains a monopoly on the 
good. A producer will not travel a great distance to 
sell his goods that are available locally, unless he 
has lower production costs than local producers, which 
will compensate for the costs of transportation. These 
lower production costs must allow him to receive 
relatively greater profits than local merchants. Goods 
on which the merchant maintains a monopoly will be 
priced in the exploitative category. The social 
relations are limited due to the geographical distance 
between the parties, and the merchant exploits this 
monopolistic situation by charging higher prices.
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Analysis of Stable Prices
A number of theories have been advanced to explain 
the apparent trend of stable prices within Mesopotamian 
cities (Curtis and Hallo 1959; Snell 1982). The 
theories advance such explanations as active 
governmental price controls, general economic 
stability, and the possibility that the bureaucratic 
system is providing a traditional price rather than the 
actual price. One explanation for stable prices within 
cities (Curtis and Hallo 1959:lllf) claims that stable 
prices reflect the state's effort to control them.
Snell (1982:191) refutes this claim since "the prices 
of the capital products, some of which appear to come 
from the state, are not uniform” . This claim is also 
in question because of the fact that no evidence has 
been found that confirms the existence of price 
controls. Price controls are very difficult to 
implement even in the modern world. Information about 
current supply levels, elasticity of demand, costs of 
production, and other critical data must be readily 
available to the controlling body or else economic 
instability will result.
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In the case of Mesopotamia, price levels would be 
difficult to actively stabilize since communications 
were extremely slow. By the time the price level was 
determined, market prices reflecting the true supply 
and demand market clearing price would be established 
and difficult to eradicate. If there was a 
governmental attempt to regulate prices, this would 
most likely result in unstable price data. Ledger 
accounts reflecting true prices would thus disagree 
with governmental prices.
Robert McC. Adams (1974) and Charles Redman (1978) 
advanced the hypothesis that part of the Mesopotamian 
economy, during the Early Dynastic period, was 
controlled by the temples, while traders conducted 
business on the side for their own benefit. This is a 
reasonable hypothesis, but no evidence exists to 
support the idea. It would also seem that a situation 
such as that would have created competition between the 
temples and the merchants. This sort of competition 
would certainly have damaged the temple's power over 
the people, since it would not have had complete 
control over the economy.
Daniel Snell advances his own theory about stable 
prices in a different period. He claims that stable 
prices reflect a "general economic stability during the
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middle years of the Ur III state" (Snell 1982:191). He 
claims that any instability during this period reflects 
bad and good years for certain products and the 
political situation during the particular time.
Finally, Snell mentions that prices could reflect 
individual price decisions made in response to unseen 
forces. These unseen forces are exposed by the formal 
economic theories employed in the present model.
Stable prices can be explained by applying the 
concepts of the present theory. Again, in order to 
apply the theory to the Mesopotamian evidence, it is 
assumed that the "closeness" of social relations 
decreases with increasing geographic distance. An 
examination of intracity social relationships exposes 
the reasons behind the stable prices.
Production costs should be similar for producers 
within the same area, since it is assumed that 
producers were relatively homogenous in their scales of 
production and had access to the same suppliers. The 
markup of goods produced and sold within a city should 
be lower, reflecting lower risks, since production and 
transportation are minimal and the social relations 
(distance) between the producer and the consumer are 
relatively close. In the short-run merchants and 
consumers have a primary economic relationship, but
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based on the model's predictions, in the long-run these 
economic relations should become secondary since the 
merchant is most likely trading in a fairly 
competitive environment and regular clients would help 
attract other customers. With a low markup and 
relatively small risk, long-run prices will tend to 
settle around an equilibrium price, which is 
demonstrated in the silver balance accounts.
If we assume that over time a merchant builds a 
social relationship with a steady customer, in the long- 
run the type of flow at the intracity level falls into 
the category of equal flow. The merchants are in 
business for profit, but due to the constraints of 
relatively close, primary social relations that develop 
in a geographically limited market area, they cannot 
(assuming no hegemonic relationships) exploit their 
customers. Also, the normal economic pressures 
generated from other competitors and imports, serve to 
keep prices hovering around a stable equilibrium.
A model of intracity exchange between a merchant 
and a regular customer can be constructed under the 
assumptions discussed above. The uncertain permanency 
of the social relations require an immediate economic 
exchange of goods, and thus risk is a factor in price 
determination. An examination of the risk-return
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relationship, illustrated below in figure 12, 
demonstrates that when a merchant faces the degree of 
risk RE, he must be compensated with the rate of return 
shown at point E, for taking that risk. This risk will 
remain constant as long as the merchant and the 
customer retain a good social relationship.
Risk Premium 
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Intracity Exchangeo
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[Riskless 
(Rate of 
Return
RE
Degree of Risk
Figur* 12. The risk-return relationship in 
an Ur III period intracity exchange.
Employing the model that demonstrates the effects 
of a ceiling price provides a graphic illustration of 
the exchange price. Figure 13 illustrates the effect 
of a ceiling price in a Mesopotamian intracity 
exchange. The price per unit is set, by the exchange
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type and the norms of the trading group in the city, at 
the amount Pc covering the merchant's investment in the 
good, but falling below the market clearing price P e . 
Excess demand XsXd is the result, but access to the 
goods is restricted to inhabitants of the city since 
the distance between cities is not easily overcome.
P
PC
0 XXs XdXe
Quantity of Good X Per Unit of Time
FIGURE 13. Effect of a ceiling price in 
an Ur III period intracity exchange.
The problem of comprehending apparently stable 
intracity prices has been solved by applying the the 
theory of economic flow and social relations. The 
theory has shown that primary social relations and 
relevant economic pressures have led to a long-run 
intracity price equilibrium. Merchants are essentially
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forced to charge a fairly consistent price to their 
regular customers.
Relative Prices
In the process of examining price stability, the 
model has exposed the fact that Mesopotamia was 
operating on the market principle. Individual 
merchants and consumers are acting in a rational manner 
in response to economic and social pressures. The fact 
that "market places" have not been found in the 
archaeological record does not prove that Mesopotamia 
was operating under some other economic system and, in 
light of the above analysis, Polanyi's "anti-market 
mentality" must be questioned.
The model can be employed to determine a relative 
price scheme for the different types of exchange that 
occured in Mesopotamia. The lowest prices for a given 
commodity displayed in the silver accounts should, 
according to the model's predictions, reflect equal 
flow occuring between a merchant and a regular customer 
within a city. A concurrent higher price on the same 
good can reflect a number of possible situations. If 
the exchange is similarly intracity, it is predicted 
that the customer is either not a regular client of the
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merchant or is not involved in good social relations 
with the merchant.
The next highest prices should be found in 
intercity exchanges. These exchanges are conducted at 
the general flow level between merchants and infrequent 
customers. The highest prices should reflect an 
exploitative flow situation where the merchant has a 
monopoly on the good. These highest prices would be 
charged to indivuals who have little or no contact with 
the merchant and live in another city.
Clearly this relative price scheme is not 
precise. The limited nature of the evidence prevents 
the development of a complex price scheme. If a true 
price scheme is eventually developed, however, the 
dynamics of the Ur III period economy will become more 
clear .
Conclusion
The Theory of Economic Flow, Social Exchange, and 
Hegemonic Relationships provides an explanation for 
stable intracity prices and unstable intercity prices. 
Unstable, intercity pricing strategies reflect: 1. The
merchant's attempt to capture the largest pure profit 
attainable; 2. The fact that imported goods arrive
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from a number of different, unspecified locations, and 
that the different risks involved are overlooked; and 
3. The fact that economic relations can be at either 
the general or the exploitative level, and in the long- 
run may, in some circumstances, move to the equal 
level. Prices on goods produced and sold within a city 
should be stable for the following reasons: They
reflect similar production costs; lower, more stable 
markups are involved; and the long-run, primary social 
relationships create lower merchant risks, and also 
result in self-imposed price ceilings.
The "limited and incomplete" evidence from 
Mesopotamia has proven to be complete enough to offer 
some support for the hypothesis that a market system 
was in effect during the Ur III period. The evidence 
has also provided enough information to shed some light 
on which "unseen forces" are acting on merchants and 
consumers. With further investigations the motivations 
of the price-setters should no longer elude us.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The first chapter of this thesis discussed the 
complex development of classical economic theory, 
Marxian economic thought, and neoclassical economic 
thought. This discussion provided the background 
necessary to critically examine the three schools of 
thought presently dominating the field of economic 
anthropology: the formalist school, the substantivist 
school, and the Marxists. The examination exposed the 
similarities and differences between the three 
schools. A brief explanation of the history, aims, and 
goals of the field of economic anthropology was also 
provided. Following the examination of the field of 
economics, the first chapter examined the development 
of formalist theory prior to 1957. Next, the 
substantivist movement, led by Karl Polanyi, was 
discussed. Each school was critically examined after
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their respective discussions. The first chapter 
concluded with an examination of the present state of 
the field, and the goals toward which it is aiming.
The second chapter of this thesis discussed the 
influences in the development of the model of Economic 
Flow, Social Exchange, and Hegemonic Relationships. 
Problems with the earlier models developed by Polanyi 
and Sahlins were exposed. Influential microeconomic 
theories developed by economists such as Bentham,
Jevons, and Menger were discussed. Finally, the 
influences of world systems theory were examined. This 
chapter set the stage for the development of the model.
Chapter three developed the General Theory of 
Economic Flow, Social Exchange, and Hegemonic 
Relationships. This section discussed the model's 
usefullness in four main areas: First, by exposing
economic and social relationships as they occur in 
power-free systems, the theory allows one to examine 
the degree of hegemony in the system under 
investigation; second, the theory provides a means of 
classification for economic systems that can be 
employed to determine which particular formal economic 
models apply to each situation; third, the theory 
provides the tools to develop a scheme of relative 
prices for a given economic situation; finally, the
168
model provides the means to identify historical 
discontinuities in economic systems. The model’s 
usefullness in these areas of inquiry allows one to 
describe the dynamics of an economic system.
The theory combines aspects of the substantivist, 
formalist, and Marxist schools of thought.
Demonstrations that this model applies across both time 
and space, and in both market and non-market economies 
were provided. Formal economic models of indifference 
analysis, consumer optimization, and theories of the 
firm provided for an examination of the rational 
behavior and motivations of merchants and individuals. 
Analyzing risk-return relationships and the effects of 
ceiling prices provided a more in depth look at the 
rational behavior of economic actors. Hegemonic and 
dynamic relationships were also considered after the 
construction of the ideal model.
The fourth chapter of this thesis applied the 
Model of Economic Flow, Social Exchange, and Hegemonic 
Relationships to historical evidence from the 
Netherlands. The emergence of the Netherlands as the 
dominant capitalist state in the seventeenth century 
provided an interesting test case for the model. The 
review of the historical background of the Netherlands, 
within the constraints of the model, shed new light on
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the economic and political factors that led to the rise 
and fall of the state.
Chapter five briefly examined the Mesopotamian, Ur 
III period. The model was employed to explain price 
stability within cities and price instability between 
cities, during this period of civilization. It was 
demonstrated that unstable prices reflect: The
merchant's attempt to capture a pure profit; the 
differential in risks involved in intercity trades and; 
the many possible social relations that can exist at 
the intercity level of exchange. Stable prices within 
cities were shown to be a reflection of: 1. similar
production costs for merchants; 2. more stable markups; 
and 3. primary social relationships that result in 
stable, self-imposed price ceilings.
In the process of examining price stability, the 
model exposed the fact that Mesopotamia could have been 
operating under the market principle. The model 
supports the hypothesis that individual merchants and 
consumers acted in a rational manner in response to 
economic and social pressures. The "limited and 
incomplete" evidence from Mesopotamia proved to be 
complete enough to show that a market system could have 
been in effect during the Ur III period. The evidence 
also provided enough information to determine which
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"unseen forces" acted on merchants and consumers during 
that time period.
This paper demonstrates that the field of economic 
anthropology is in need of a better paradigm. The 
early formalist approach was based on incorrect 
economic assumptions and had many problems. Karl 
Polanyi's anti-market approach provided the field with 
a new approach, but it is now outdated. Polanyi's 
approach was also originally based on incorrect 
economic assumptions. The formalist's answer to 
Polanyi was a move in the right direction, but still 
lacked critical assumptions. Recently, some authors 
have discussed approaches similar to the present 
theory, but stopped short of completing it (see Klein 
1973 and Adams 1976).
The General Theory of Economic Flow, Social 
Exchange, and Hegemonic Relationships allows one to 
predict social relations based on economic relations 
and vice-versa. Comparing predicted relations to 
actual observed relations exposes the hegemony present 
in the system. The model demonstrates that economic 
analysis can be employed cross-culturally and that it 
is an extremely powerful aid in the understanding of 
dynamic social and economic systems. Premarket 
economies as well as market economies can be analyzed
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with this approach and more economic situations should 
be tested with the model to insure its cross-cultural 
applicability. An examination of the recent changes in 
the global economy with the inclusion of the Eastern 
Bloc states would be an interesting test case for 
modern economics, and an application of the model to an 
archaeological hunter-gather community would test the 
models ability to explain prehistoric economies.
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